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PENETRATING DOCTRINAL CAMOUFLAGE:
UNDERSTANDING THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE LAW OF WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
Cornelius J. Peck*
Abstract: American courts developed the employment-at-will doctrine during the post-
Civil War period of industrial and commercial expansion. Under that doctrine, either an
employer or an employee could terminate an employment contract for any reason, good or
bad. In the early 1980s, state supreme courts increasingly recognized exceptions to the
employment-at-will doctrine to provide greater job protection for employees. In creating
those exceptions, state courts have manipulated and stretched traditional legal doctrine to
camouflage their reformist program. But that camouflage which facilitated changes in the
law now often obscures the- original reason for departing from the employment-at-will
doctrine. Some state courts, including the Supreme Court of Washington, have lost sight
of the original objective of providing adequate job protection and base their decisions on
doctrinal technicalities. The Author suggests that courts should abandon the camouflage
of traditional legal doctrine and give explicit recognition to a rule requiring just cause for
termination of employment.
A commonplace comment about Americans is that they describe
themselves in terms of the jobs they hold. The identification of person-
ality with employment elevates employment to a very high ranking
among the non-economic interests valued by Americans. Employ-
ment is also of great importance to most people because, given current
means of production, it is necessary for their survival and determines
the level of comfort and enjoyment at which they and their families
will live. Most Americans believe that government provides protec-
tion against the destruction of important economic and non-economic
interests, and it is a great surprise to many to learn that, at least until
recently, employees have had no general protection from unjust or
arbitrary terminations of their employment.'
* Professor of Law, University of Washington. This Article elaborates on an earlier article
Professor Peck wrote in 1979, predicting that by the end of this century American courts would
no longer recognize the employment-at-will doctrine, Peck, Unjust Discharges From
Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHio ST. LJ. 1 (1979). More recently,
Professor Peck published a review of two major treatises on employee dismissal law, Peck, Book
Review, 8 INDUS. REL L.J. 263 (1986), updating his earlier comments.
An excellent summary of national developments may be found in a symposium issue of the
Nebraska Law Review on Employment Rights, 67 NEn. L. REv. 1-210 (1988). The authors
include Clyde B. Summers, William B. Gould IV, Theodore St. Antoine, and Jack Stieber.
A recent survey of the developments in Washington, less critical of the decisions than the
appraisal given them in this Article, is Wall, At-Will Employment in Washington:. A Review of
Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co. and Its Progeny, 14 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 71 (1990).
1. A telephone survey conducted in Omaha, Nebraska, of 250 households (132 agreed to
participate in the survey) produced results showing that most persons did not know an employer
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From the latter part of the nineteenth century until quite recently,
the employment contracts of most employees in the United States
were terminable at the will of the employer. This general principle
was known as the employment-at-will doctrine. It is (or was) an
American creation. The doctrine provides that, absent some consider-
ation other than the services to be performed, a contract of employ-
ment for an indefinite term is a contract terminable at the will of either
party. An agreement that the employee will be compensated a desig-
nated amount on an annual, monthly, weekly, or daily basis is consid-
ered to fix only the rate of pay and not the duration of the
employment. Pursuant to the doctrine, an employer can discharge an
employee for any cause, no cause, or bad cause without liability. Like-
wise, employees can leave their employment at will and without notice
or liability. Historically, however, the primary beneficiaries of the
doctrine have been employers.2 Within the last decade, state supreme
courts have made revisions and modifications of the employment-at-
will doctrine. The thesis of this Article is that those courts did so
because other developments in law gave new emphasis to the impor-
tance of Americans' interest in employment and demonstrated that the
doctrine was an anachronism, unsuited to contemporary conditions.
As is a familiar phenomenon of common law development, many of
the changes to the doctrine were accomplished by a camouflaged
twisting and misuse of doctrinal principles. Unfortunately, as case law
developed and precedents accumulated, many courts forgot why the
revision of the law was undertaken, and became immersed in doctrinal
arguments. As a consequence, they lost sight of their original objec-
tive to provide adequate protection for employees from unjust or arbi-
trary terminations of employment. The Supreme Court of
Washington originally approached the task with some timidity, and
the court in its recent decisions appears to have abandoned the goal of
providing real job protection for employees.
had the right to terminate employment without giving a cause. Around 90% of the respondents
believed it was unethical for an employer to terminate employment unless there was good cause.
Forbes & Jones, A Comparative Attitudinal, and Analytical Study of Dismissal of At-Will
Employees Without Cause, 37 LAB. L.J. 157, 165-66 (1986).
Anyone doubting the validity of the study will probably quickly receive confirmation of its
accuracy by conducting his or her own poll of non-lawyer friends and acquaintances.
2. For a University of Chicago view that employment-at-will is of great benefit to employees,
see Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHi. L. Rnv. 947 (1984).
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL
DOCTRINE
English common law was not the source of the employment-at-will
doctrine. To the contrary, by the time of Blackstone the English com-
mon law had evolved a rule that if the hiring of a servant was general
it would be construed as a hiring for one year No master could "put
away his servant" during the one year term of employment "unless
upon reasonable cause to be allowed by a justice of the peace."4 Nor
could the master terminate the relationship at the end of the term
"without a quarter's warning."5 Apprentices could be discharged "on
reasonable cause" upon the request of the master at the quarter session
courts.6 Laborers hired by the day or week who did not live in the
master's house apparently did not enjoy this job security. But during
the nineteenth century the English common law evolved the rule that,
unless otherwise specifically agreed upon, employment was terminable
only after notice fixed by the custom of the trade, or after a reasonable
time if there was no custom, unless there was cause for summary
dismissal.7
A. Development of the Employment-At-Will Doctrine in the United
States
During the early colonial period, American law applicable to
employment contracts generally followed English common law. An
important difference was that, unlike English courts, American courts
did not apply criminal law to employee breaches of contract. Instead,
employer refusals to give an "honorable discharge" prior to one year
of service, wage withholdings, and a functioning system of blacklisting
enforced the contract for employers, and rendered the annual contract
of employment of little value to employees. After 1850, employers in
the New England textile industry asserted their power to dismiss at a
moment's notice, while still requiring employees to give notice before
they quit.' American law was in a confused and uncertain state and
seldom used.
3. 1 W. BLACKSToNE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 425 (21st ed. 1847).
4. Id.
5. Id
6. Id at 426.
7. 2 CHITrY ON CONTRACTS §§ 1103-1105 & n.22 (". Morris 22d ed. 1961); F. MEYERS,
OWNERSHIP OF JOBS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 21-22 (1964).
For an excellent summary of the developments in the English common law, see Jacoby, The
Duration of the Indefinite Employment Contracts in the United States and England: An Historical
Analysis, in EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 3-42 (1985).
8. Jacoby, supra note 7, at 20-25.
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Development of the employment-at-will doctrine in America is fre-
quently attributed to the publication in 1877 of H. Wood's treatise on
the law of master and servant.9 In that treatise, Wood said:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima
facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly
hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof. A hiring at so
much a day, week, month or year, no time being specified, is an indefi-
nite hiring, and no presumption attaches that it was for a day even, but
only at the rate fixed for whatever time the party may serve.
10
Recently, critics have pointed out that the cases Wood cited did not
support the proposition he stated,1 but it is wrong to attribute devel-
opment of the doctrine entirely to his erroneous statement. David
Dudley Field and Alexander Bradford set out a similar rule for their
proposed New York Civil Code,1 2 which later was adopted as the Cali-
fornia Civil Code in 1872. Section 1999 of the California Code stated:
"An employment having no specified term may be terminated at the
will of either party, on notice to the other, except where otherwise
provided by this Title."1 3 As with Wood's treatise, none of the cases
cited supported the codified proposition. 4
Despite their errors, both statements established a rule well suited
to employer needs in America's developing industrial and commercial
society. The courts readily adopted the rule, preferring it over a rule
presuming an annual hiring or a rule presuming employment for the
period stated for the rate of pay.15 In the United States the "collar
line" did not have the significance it had in England, and employment-
at-will deprived office clerical employees of job protection which their
counterparts in England still enjoyed. 6
With the passage of time, the employment-at-will doctrine achieved
more than acceptance. The United States Supreme Court gave it con-
stitutional protection in decisions invalidating federal and state stat-
9. H. WOOD, LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT (1877).
10. Id. at 272.
11. Blumrosen, Employer Discipline: U.S. Report, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 428, 432-33 (1964);
Jacoby, supra note 7, at 27; Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335,
340-47 (1974).
12. D. FIELD & A. BRADFORD, THE CIVIL CODE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK vii (Albany
1865), cited in W. HOLLOWAY & M. LEECH, EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION, RIGHTS AND
REMEDIES 25 n.161 (1985); Jacoby, supra note 7, at 25.
13. 1 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1999 (1872).
14. Jacoby, supra note 7, at 25.
15. Id. at 28-31.
16. Id. at 34-35.
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utes enacted to protect membership in labor unions. 7 The doctrine
never found a place in the Restatement of Contracts, and Corbin
insisted that the question of the duration of a contract of employment
was "one of factual interpretation, and very frequently... a jury ques-
tion."18 Williston, however, accepted the concept that a contract not
for a fixed term was terminable at will,19 and the Restatement of
Agency explained that a contract of employment for a salary propor-
tionate to units of time does not indicate that the contract is to con-
tinue for the stated period of time.20 The pervasiveness of the doctrine
is demonstrated in an American Law Reports note of 1975, which sum-
marized numerous American employment cases and concluded that:
"few legal principles would seem to be better settled than the broad
generality that an employment for an indefinite term is regarded as an
employment-at-will which may -be terminated at any time by either
party for any reason or for no reason at all."'21
B. Beginnings of the Rejection of the Doctrine
As has happened in other contexts, decisional sports established a
basis for revision of the employment-at-will doctrine.2 The first, but
then unrecognized, break in the employment-at-will doctrine was
made in 1959 by the Court of Appeals of California in Petermann v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 396.23 In Petermann,
the plaintiff alleged that he was discharged from his employment as a
union business representative because he disregarded orders to commit
perjury at a state legislative committee hearing. The court recognized
that the employment-at-will doctrine prevailed in California, but con-
cluded that a discharge for refusing to commit perjury conflicted with
public policy of such importance that the plaintiff was entitled to a
judicial remedy. So firmly established was the employment-at-will
17. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
18. 3A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 684 (1960).
19. 9 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1017, at 129-30 (3d ed.
1967).
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 442 comment b (1958).
21. Annotation, Employee's Arbitrary Dismissal as Breach of Employment Contract
Terminable at Will, 62 A.L.R.3d 271, 271 (1975).
22. For example, it is possible that the doctrine ofres ipsa loquitur would not have developed
if it were not for the fact that Baron Pollock's knowledge of Latin led him to use the phrase
during the course of an argument about the sufficiency of a circumstantial evidence case. W.
PAGE KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 243-44 (5th ed. 1984).
23. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
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doctrine that Petermann was viewed as a sport rather than as general
modification of employment law.24
Five years later, Professor Blumrosen of Rutgers University Law
School demonstrated that Wood's statement of the employment-at-
will doctrine was not supported by the cases he cited.25 In the same
article, Professor Blumrosen also pointed out that the United States'
legal system had developed a broad array of statutory and other
restraints on employer power to discharge employees. 26 In 1967, Pro-
fessor Larry Blades wrote what has become a leading and frequently
cited article calling for the development of a tort remedy to protect
employees from abusive exercise of power by employers.27
In 1973, the Supreme Court of Indiana concluded that the discharge
of an employee for filing a worker's compensation claim was actiona-
ble, treating the discharge as a statutorily prohibited device for defeat-
ing claims.28 With such a specific statutory base the decision did not
have the appearance of a broad attack on the employment-at-will
doctrine.
C. Early Public Policy and Tort Law Limitations
It was not until 1974 that the Petermann decision was judicially
extended to a general limitation on employer power to discharge. In
Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.,29 the plaintiff, a married woman, alleged
and presented evidence to show that she was discharged because she
refused to go out with her foreman after completing work on the night
shift. The New Hampshire Supreme Court, citing Petermann as well
as Professors Blades and Blumrosen, concluded that it could not
ignore "the new climate prevailing generally in the relationship of
employer and employee."3  It held that "a termination by the
employer of a contract of employment-at-will which is motivated by
24. Petermann was noted by only two law reviews during the year following the case's
publication. Comment, Contracts-Termination of Employment at Will-Public Policy May
Modify Employer's Right to Discharge: Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters
Local 396, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1959), 14 RUTGERS L. REv. 624 (1960); Note, Contracts-
Termination-Employment for Indefinite Duration Not Terminable for Refusal of Employee to
Commit Perjury, 14 VAND. L. REV. 397 (1960). The author of the Vanderbilt Law Review Note
doubted that the decision would be extended to other employment problems and questioned
whether it would even be followed in other similar cases. Id. at 401.
25. Blumrosen, supra note 11.
26. Id.
27. Blades, Employment at Will vs Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of
Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404 (1967).
28. Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
29. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
30. Id. at 551.
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bad faith or malice or based on retaliation is not [in] the best interest
of the economic system or the public good and constitutes a breach of
the employment contract."31 Similarly, in 1975, the Supreme Court of
Oregon held that a discharge from employment-at-will for serving on
jury duty was a prima facie tort for which damages should be awarded
because of the community interest in encouraging jury service.32
In 1978, the Supreme Court of West Virginia recognized a tort basis
for recovery by an at-will employee in Harless v. First National
Bank 33 The court held that an at-will employee could recover dam-
ages, including damages for emotional distress, for a discharge for
reporting intentional violations of consumer protection laws.34 In
1979, the Supreme Court of Illinois held actionable on a tort basis a
discharge for filing a worker's compensation claim, rejecting the
employer's argument that such a recovery could be had only if the
worker's compensation act made provision for such a suit.35
In 1980, the California Supreme Court ratified the Petermann hold-
ing in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co.36 The plaintiff in Tameny
alleged that he had been discharged for refusing to participate in an
illegal scheme to fix retail gasoline prices.3 7 The court rejected the
employer's argument that an action for wrongful discharge sounds
only in contract, in which case the "common law" terminable at-will
rule codified in section 2922 of the California Labor Code would have
controlled.38 The court based plaintiff's right to recover on tort law,
accepting the proposition that an employer's power to terminate
employment may be limited by express statutory objectives or firmly
established principles of public policy.39
D. Early Contractual Limitations
Contractual limitations of an employer's power to discharge at will
developed in two ways. One was recognition that an implied covenant
of good faith in employment contracts imposed such a limitation. The
other was relaxation of the evidence required to establish that an
enforceable promise had been made and accepted.
31. Id
32. Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512, 516 (1975).
33. 162 W. Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978).
34. 246 S.E.2d at 276.
35. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74111. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353, 358 (1978).
36. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
37. 610 P.2d at 1330-31.
38. Id at 1334.
39. Id at 1336.
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In 1977, in Fortune v. National Cash Register Co.," the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that an employer was liable
under an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing of an employ-
ment contract when it discharged the plaintiff salesman in order to
avoid payment of a commission on a sale he had made. The
employer's bad faith attempt to deprive the employee of an earned
commission had the appearance of fraud. Indeed, the implied cove-
nant resembles tort law in that its obligations are derived not from the
negotiations and agreement reached by the parties, but are imposed by
general law on those in contractual relationships, much as tort law
imposes other obligations on the parties to various relationships.4"
In 1980, the Supreme Court of Michigan's decision in Toussaint v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield dramatically developed contract law applica-
ble to negotiated agreements.42 In that case, the Michigan Court held
that an employee's expectations grounded on statements in an
employer's manual of personnel policies were contractually enforcea-
ble even though no pre-employment negotiations took place and there
was no meeting of the parties' minds on the subject.43 The court rea-
soned it was enough that the employer chose to create an environment
in which employees believed that the employer's policies and practices
were fair and applied consistently and uniformly.' The court also
held that employer statements that an employee would be with the
company "as long as I did my job" or that he would not be discharged
if he was "doing the job" could be found by a jury to have created an
agreement for a contract of employment for an indefinite term, but
terminable only for cause.45 The Michigan court's discussion of cases
in which contracts for "permanent employment" were held to be ter-
minable at will" indicates that in earlier years the statements in Tous-
saint would have been denied contractual significance for being too
vague and indefinite. A fair appraisal of the decision leads to the con-
clusion that the court stretched both the principle of estoppel and the
rules of evidence to provide job protection for the employees.
40. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1258 (1977).
41. See W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 373-85 (5th ed. 1984).
42. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
43. 292 N.W.2d at 892.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 890.
46. Id. at 888-90; see also Stieber & Baines, The Michigan Experience With Employment-At-
Will, 67 NEB. L. REV. 140, 144-46 (1988); Annotation, supra note 21.
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E. Reasons for Judicially Imposed Limits on Employer Power
As this survey of developments demonstrates, by the beginning of
the 1980s, a number of state supreme courts had undertaken a revision
of the employment-at-will doctrine. By undertaking such a revision,
these courts manifested a willingness to curtail the power the doctrine
previously gave to employers. What caused this undertaking? Surely
the answer is not that long established legal doctrines suddenly devel-
oped a previously undetected potency and malleability. The doctrines
were revised to achieve a balance in the relationship between employ-
ers and employees better suited to the conditions of contemporary
society.
The primary cause of this judicial activism was an understanding
derived by judges from their experience in construing and enforcing a
host of statutes prohibiting discharges from employment for a variety
of reasons. Those statutes 'evidenced a legislative judgment that
employee interests in employment deserved protection from the
unhindered power of employers to discharge, and that the interests of
society would be better served by limiting that power even though it
encumbered the freedom of employers to direct and manage busi-
nesses. Writings of academics questioning and attacking the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine played a supportive role.47 Some of those
writings persuasively demonstrated that law in the United States had
failed to develop job protection for employees to the level enjoyed by
employees in every other developed country and in many underdevel-
oped or third world countries.48 And developments of constitutional
law that had produced job protections for government employees
made it difficult as a practical matter to justify the arbitrary and capri-
47. In addition to the articles cited supra notes 11 and 26,' see Summers, Individual Protection
Against Unjust Dismissak Time For A Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481 (1976).
48. See Weyand, Present Status of Individual Employee Rights, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW
YORK UNIVERSITY TWENTY-SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 171, 209 (T.
Christensen ed. 1970). Weyand summarized a report of the International Labor Organization
based on a study conducted in 1962. Statutory regulation of termination of employment existed
in 76 countries, including Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, France, Germany, Japan, Spain, Switzerland,
Turkey, the USSR, the United Arab Republic, and Yugoslavia.
See also INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORG., LABOUR CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1919-1981, at 138-41 (1982). The text of the recommendations may be found in Extracts from
the International Labor Office Report, 18 RUTGERS L. REv. 446, 449-55 (1964).
See also Estreicher, Unjust Dismissal Laws: Some Cautionary Notes, 33 AM. J. COMP. L. 310
(1985); Summers, supra note 47, at 508-19 (describes the protections provided by the laws of
France, Germany, Great Britain, and Sweden).
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cious action of private employers tolerated by the employment-at-will
doctrine.49
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19640 made it unlawful to dis-
charge any individual because of that individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. The Federal Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act51 also gave protection to persons between the ages of forty
and seventy from discharge because of their age and unproven per-
formance deficiencies assumed to accompany age. States and some
municipalities adopted even more comprehensive laws prohibiting dis-
crimination in employment on the basis of still other attributes, such
as handicap or marital status.5 2
Since 1935, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) has prohib-
ited discrimination against employees to encourage or discourage
membership in labor unions.53 Earlier, the Railway Labor Act (RLA)
prohibited such discrimination against employees covered by that
Act.5 4 In addition, many other statutes conferred job protection on
special groups of employees or from specialized types of employer
actions.55
Judicial and administrative developments under the NLRA and the
RLA extended the protection of organized employees considerably
beyond the prohibition against discharge or discipline because of
union activities. The Supreme Court found in those statutes a duty of
fair representation that runs from a union to A employees in a repre-
49. For example, in Toussaint the Michigan Supreme Court referred to and relied on the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (lack of a
contractual or tenure right to re-employment did not defeat state college professor's claim that
non-renewal of his contract violated his free speech rights under the first and fourteenth
amendments).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988). The Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. Railway
Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975), had also established that discrimination in employment on
the basis of race was prohibited by the post-Civil War Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
51. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1985).
52. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES MANUAL § 451, at
101-05 (1990).
53. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-69 (1988)).
54. Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1988));
see Texas & N.O.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930).
55. For example, the Selective Service Act of 1940 required reinstatement of veterans to their
former positions of employment after discharge from military service, specifically providing that
a person so reinstated "shall not be discharged from such position without cause within one year
after such restoration." Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 8(c), 54 Stat. 885,
890 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 301-318 (1988)). The Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 90-321, § 304(a), 82 Stat. 146, 163 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a)),
provides protection against discharge because of a wage garnishment "for any one indebtedness."
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sented bargaining unit.56 Breach of the duty of fair representation
constitutes an unfair labor practice under the NLRA,57 with the con-
sequence that an aggrieved employee is able to obtain the investigatory
and legal services of the NLRB. This is of immediate significance
when the claimed breach of the duty of fair representation is a failure
to process a grievance concerning discharge or discipline. Both the
judicial remedy of a law suit against the employer and the union, and
the administrative remedy of a NLRB proceeding are available if there
has been a breach of the duty of fair representation.58
In the 1970s, somewhat less than twenty-eight percent of the non-
agricultural work force was employed pursuant to the terms of a col-
lective bargaining agreement, 9 and approximately ninety-five percent
of those agreements contained grievance and arbitration provisions.'
Employers had the burden of proving just cause for discharge or disci-
pline in cases that reached the arbitration level.61 Judges who
enforced awards against employers for alleged improper discharge or
decided cases against unions for breach of the duty of fair representa-
tion must have been impressed that the power of government was used
to ensure that employees receive from unions the full protection pro-
vided by a collective bargaining agreement. For organized employees,
the law ensured that discharges be only for just cause, but unorganized
employees were subject to employer power that could be exercised in
an arbitrary or unfair manner.
United States employees and most state government employees also
enjoy substantial protections against unjust discharge from employ-
ment. In 1976, the 2,879,000 civilian employees of the federal govern-
ment constituted about three percent of all persons employed in the
United States.62 Over ninety percent of these federal employees are
tenured and enjoy the procedural safeguards that Congress and the
then Civil Service Commission provided against "adverse action"
taken by supervisors.63 In 1976, there were 12,170,000 state and local
56. For a general discussion of the duty of fair representation, see R. GORMAN, LABOUR
LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 695-728 (1976).
57. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 178-80 (1967).
58. Id
59. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DIRECTORY OF NATIONAL
UNIONS AND EMPLOYEE ASSOCIATIONS 72 (1973).
60. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, BULL. No. 1425-1, MAJOR
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS: GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES (1964).
61. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBrrRATION WORKS 661 (4th ed. 1985).
62. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNrrED STATES 268, table 441 (1977) [hereinafter STATSTICAL ASTrRACT].
63. Merrill, Procedures for Adverse Actions Against Federal Employees, 59 VA. L. REv. 196,
198, 209 (1973).
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government employees, of whom 3,340,000 were state employees. 64
Reliable information is not available on how many of these have civil
service type job protection, but a conservative estimate would be that
more than half are so protected.
It thus appears that at the end of the 1970s, between thirty-five and
forty percent of the non-agricultural work force had substantial spe-
cific protection against discharge without cause. In addition, while
Title VII and other statutes prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
race, sex, national origin, or religion apply directly only to discharges
made on the forbidden basis, the effect of the statutes is to confer a
much more comprehensive protection. Employers have recognized
that a discharge of a member of a protected class made without just
cause is very susceptible to characterization as a discharge for the pro-
hibited reason. 65 They therefore have become much more careful to
ensure that a discharge of a member of a protected class is a discharge
for just cause. First line supervisors are unlikely to have the power to
discharge; their recommendations for discharge will be reviewed to
ensure that incidents of unsatisfactory behavior are properly docu-
mented, followed by warnings, and that a valid substantive reason for
termination of employment exists. The care exercised by employers
must have been obvious to judges considering employer defenses to
charges by employees of prohibited discrimination.
As indicated above, the law governing termination of employment
offers employees in the United States far less protection than the law
of other developed countries.66 Furthermore, unjust discharge is a
major phenomenon of employment in the United States. Professor
Clyde Summers of the University of Pennsylvania Law School esti-
mates that American employers unfairly terminate approximately
200,000 employees every year; and Professor Jack Steiber of Michigan
State School of Labor and Industrial Relations "conservatively" esti-
mates that each year 50,000 employees would be able to get their jobs
64. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 62, at 306, table 489.
65. An applicant for employment establishes a prima facie case of discrimination under Title
vii by showing that: (i) he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) he applied and was qualified for a job
for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) despite his qualifications he was rejected; and
(iv) after his rejection the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants
from persons of his qualifications. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802
(1973). If a prima facie case is established, the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate
some legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the rejection. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-55 (1981). Lower courts have developed analogous models for
other types of employment discrimination, such as discharge or failure to promote. See, e.g.,
Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1981).
66. See supra note 48.
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back if an appropriate remedy existed to appeal a discharge.67 My
own estimate, derived from Federal Mediation and Conciliation Ser-
vice and the American Arbitration Association statistics, is that there
would be as many as 300,000 claims of unjust discharge made every
year if the standards applicable to discharge cases in the unionized
sector of United States employment were applicable to the non-union
sector. After settlement negotiations, 12,000 to 15,000 of those claims
would proceed to trial or arbitration.
68
Accepting my calculations for the purposes of argument, Professors
Freed and Polsby estimate that the probability of an employee who is
not protected by some form of just cause regime being unfairly disci-
plined or discharged during a year is .5769%. From this, Freed and
Polsby concluded that the cost of providing job protection is too
great.6 9 That probability, however, turns into more than a five percent
67. Employment-At-Will in the 1980s: A Look Ahead-The Experts Predict; IlI Lab. Rel.
Rep. (BNA), pt. 2, at 25-26 (Nov. 22, 1982) (statement of Clyde Summers).
In an address delivered at a conference at Michigan State on Employment-At-Will Professor
Stieber estimated that in the 1980s private sector employers terminated the employment of
approximately 3,000,000 employees annually for non-economic reasons. See Gould, Job Security
in the United Stater Some Reflections on Unfair Dismissal and Plant Closure Legislation from a
Comparative Perspective, 67 NEB. L. REv. 28, 31 (1988).
68. In 1976, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) made 10,509
appointments of arbitrators. In 1977, the American Arbitration Association (AAA) provided
parties with panels of arbitrators in 14,661 cases. Because of settlements reached by the parties,
only 5,550 of the appointments made by the FMCS resulted in awards, of which 2,150 concerned
discharge or discipline. Assuming that the same proportion of AAA cases for which panels are
submitted result in an award and relate to discharge or discipline, it appears that approximately
3,500 discharge or discipline cases are decided annually by arbitrators appointed by the FMCS or
the AAA. It seems likely that an equal number of cases are decided annually by permanent
arbitrators or arbitrators selected on an ad hoc basis by the parties. If so, each year produces
about 7,000 cases of discharge or discipline of employees that labor union officers believe to be
unjustifiable and worthy of arbitration. Arbitrators overturn management decisions in somewhat
more than half of the cases. The assumption that employers whose employees are represented by
unions are more careful about discharges and discipline than employers who do not have such a
check on their decisions, provides the basis for my estimate. See Peck, Unjust Discharges From
EmploymenL" A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHio ST. L. J. 1, 9-10 (1979).
69. Freed & Posby, Just Cause For Termination Rules And Economic Efficiency, 38 EMORY
LJ. 1097, 1106-07 (1989). They reach the conclusion that providing the protection would cost
employees more in reduced wages than most employees would be willing to pay despite their
recognition that protection against unjust dismissal is a standard provision in collective
bargaining agreements. This real world fact that employees will pay for job protection with
reduced wages indicates what employees bargain for when they get bargaining power through
unionization. Instead of looking at the real world, the authors reason from an unrealistic model
of a work force in which 49 of 100 employees would not be willing to pay what it costs an
employer to provide job protection and are forced to do so because a union shop clause permits
union officers to bargain for what individual employees would not seek. Id. at 1118-22.
An excellent article demonstrating the dangers of economic analysis not based on empirical
data is Willborn, Indivi4ual Employment Rights and the Standard Economic Objection: Theory
and Empiricism, 67 NEB. L. REV. 101 (1988). Willborm concludes that, depending upon what
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chance over a period of ten years. Surely, if one identified a product
that caused cancer in five percent of employees within a ten-year
period, that product would be banned from industrial use.
Judges hearing cases of alleged discrimination in violation of stat-
utes must have become impressed with the frequency with which
employers discharge employees for reasons unrelated to the sound
operation of their business. They must also have noticed the frequent
legislative judgments that the interests of employees in continued
employment outweigh the interests of employers in unfettered power
to terminate employment. And they must have wondered why only
special groups or classes of employees deserved protection against
arbitrary, capricious, or simply unjustified decisions by supervisors to
discharge an employee. Indeed, it began to appear that only white
males under the age of forty lacked some kind of job protection; and
the question must have arisen of why it was just to protect employees
from decisions based on arbitrary factors of race, sex, national origin,
or religion, without providing protection against decisions that were
equally arbitrary because they were not based on relevant factors of
job performance and work needs.
Thoughts such as those outlined above gave rise to what is some-
times called the erosion of the employment-at-will doctrine, and at
other times referred to as the provision of job protection. As sug-
gested above, doctrinal principles were not suddenly infused with new
strength from some judicial reservoir. Rather, judges modified those
doctrinal principles and put them to use by conferring new and greater
protection on the employment interest. The process began because
judges became convinced that the employment-at-will doctrine as pre-
viously applied no longer was suitable to the conditions of contempo-
rary society.
Thus, in the leading decision of Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.,70 the
New Hampshire Court said:
The employer has long ruled the workplace with an iron hand by reason
of the prevailing common-law rule that such a hiring is presumed to be
at will and terminable at any time by either party ....
The law governing the relations between employer and employee has
... evolved over the years to reflect changing legal, social and economic
conditions ....
empirical data establishes, the setting of minimal terms of employment contracts, such as a
requirement of just cause for discharge, could receive very powerful support from economic
analysis. Id.
70. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
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In all employment contracts, whether at will or for a definite term, the
employer's interest in running his business as he sees fit must be bal-
anced against the interest of the employee in maintaining his employ-
ment, and the public's interest in maintaining a proper balance between
the two. 7 1
In the earlier California case of Petermann v. International Brother-
hood of Teamsters Local 39672 the court supplemented its public pol-
icy rationale for invalidating the discharge with the observation:
When one, who has been employed for such time as his services are
satisfactory, is discharged it is "well settled that the employer must act
in good faith; and, where there is evidence tending to show that the
discharge was due to reasons other than dissatisfaction with the services
the question is one for the jury."73
In 1980, the Supreme Court of New Jersey said:
In the last century, the common law developed in a laissez-faire climate
that encouraged industrial growth and approved the right of an
employer to control his own business, including the right to fire without
cause an employee at will .... The twentieth century has witnessed
significant changes in socioeconomic values that have led to reassess-
ment of the common law rule. Businesses have evolved from small and
medium size firms to gigantic corporations in which ownership is sepa-
rate from management. Formerly there was a clear delineation between
employers, who frequently were owners of their businesses, and employ-
ees. The employer in the old sense has been replaced by a superior in
the corporate hierarchy who is himself an employee. We are a nation of
employees. Growth in the number of employees has been accompanied
by increasing recognition of the need for stability in labor relations.74
The Illinois Supreme Court said in reviewing the history of the
employment-at-will doctrine that: "[i]t is now recognized that a proper
balance must be maintained among the employer's interest in operat-
ing a business efficiently and profitably, the employee's interest in earn-
71. 316 A.2d at 551 (emphasis added).
72. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
73. 344 P.2d at 28 (citations omitted).
74. Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505, 509 (1980). More
recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court said:
No longer is there the unquestioned deference to the interests of the employer and the
almost invariable dismissal of the contentions of the employee. Instead, as Justice Pollock
so effectively demonstrated [in Pierce], this Court was no longer willing to decide these
questions without examining the underlying interests involved, both the employer's and the
employees', as well as the public interest and the extent to which our deference to one or the
other served or disserved the needs of society as presently understood.
Woolley v. Hoffinan-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257, 1261 (1985).
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ing a livelihood, and society's interest in seeing its public policies
carried out."75
More recently, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina said in its
review of the erosion of employment-at-will: "[c]ourts have begun to
respond to a perceived need to protect non-contract employees from
abusive practices by the employer. "76
Such an undertaking by the judiciary is in accord with the finest
common law traditions. Revision or overturning of judicially made
rules is not an usurpation of legislative powers. The judiciary has
made comparable changes in tort law in the areas of products liability,
responsibilities of the medical profession, the effect of contributory
negligence in tort actions, land occupiers' liability, sovereign immu-
nity, charitable immunity, interspousal and parental immunity, liabil-
ity for causing emotional distress, and liability for purely economic
losses.77 The judiciary engrafted the duty of fair representation of
unions onto the RLA and the NLRA, and the judiciary also estab-
lished arbitration as a king pin of our national policy governing the
relationship between employers and unions.7 8
Courts have also played a creative role in the development of family
law, as, for example, in the recognition of "palimony" in response to
changed life styles.7 9 These types of activity pose no threat to repre-
sentational democracy so long as the courts respect a legislative
response when the judicial activity serves as a catalyst for legislative
consideration of problems previously overlooked by legislatures.
II. CURRENT THEORIES OF RECOVERY FOR
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
Although courts have been willing to undertake the task of revising
employment law to provide job protection for employees, they have
been unwilling to do it by establishing a new and comprehensive rule
that an employer must have just cause for terminating employment.
Instead, courts prefer to use the camouflage of the terminology of
familiar doctrines or principles of law, stretching and misshaping
75. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (1981)
(emphasis added).
76. Sides v. Duke Univ., 74 N.C. App. 331, 328 S.E.2d 818, 824, cert. denied, 314 N.C. 331,
333 S.E.2d 490 (1985).
77. Peck, Comments on Judicial Creativity, 69 IOWA L. REv. 1, 13-24 (1983).
78. Id. at 31-37.
79. Id. at 40-42.
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those doctrines or principles." If the terminology is familiar, the sub-
stantive change receives less attention. The courts have used the doc-
trines and principles found in both contract and tort law to revise
employment law.
A. Recent Developments in Contract Law
Recent changes in employment contract law fall into two categories:
(1) relaxation of the evidentiary requirements for establishing that the
employment contract precluded discharges other' than for cause, and
(2) application of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to
employment contracts. The changes have provided protection for
employees in the cases in which they were developed, but that protec-
tion is limited if courts permit employers to insert disclaimers of con-
tractual obligation. In particular, allowing employers to insert
disclaimers conflicts with the recognition of an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. Indeed, if the covenant is considered to
require employer justification for discharge on the basis ofbusiness or
operational needs, its recognition could produce a requirement of just
cause for termination of employment. 8 Recognition of disclaimers
ignores the reasons for the changes made in contract law.
1. Loosening the Evidentiary Requirements
The changed evidentiary requirements for establishing that an
employment contract precludes discharges other than for cause are
exemplified in the decision of the Supreme Court of Michigan in Tous-
saint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield.82 When he inquired about job secur-
ity in a pre-employment interview, Toussaint was told that he would
80. Compare the development of strict liability for defective products. For years the courts
circumvented the common law requirement of privity of contract with fictions of warranties that
ran with the product, agencies to make purchases for family and members of the household, and
"inherently dangerous" products until Cardozo produced his famous opinion in MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). Food- and drink and products for
intimate bodily contact were distinguished as products for which it would not be necessary to
establish negligence to recover for a defect. Res ipsa loquitur was stretched to establish
negligence of manufacturers despite subsequent handling by others prior to delivery to the
injured consumer. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436, 438-39
(1944). Ultimately, it took the courage and leadership of the late Chief Justice Traynor of
California to state frankly in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962), that there was a new strict tort liability for defective products. See
Peck, supra note 77, at 14.
81. The author proposes job protection against discharges allegedly for causes other than
economic considerations. It would not, therefore, provide protection against layoffs or
termination of employment because of recessions or declines in the employer's business.
82. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
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be with the company "as long as I did my job." The other plaintiff,
who had concerns about a potential conflict with his immediate super-
visor, was told that if he was "doing the job" he would not be dis-
charged. 3 In addition, when Toussaint inquired about job security on
the day of his hire, he was handed a "Supervisory Manual" in a three
ring, looseleaf binder consisting of 250 pages covering eleven catego-
ries of employment policies, one of which related to terminations. The
manual made no reference to Toussaint, his job description, or his
compensation, and was not signed by him or a management represen-
tative.84 It thus lacked the detail one would expect in an individual
contract of employment. Nevertheless, four of the seven justices of the
court held that the oral assurances and receipt of the manual were
sufficient evidence to support the juries' conclusions that there were
oral or unwritten contracts that the plaintiffs would be discharged
from employment only for cause.8 5
In Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 6 the California Court of Appeals
concluded that there could be an implied-in-fact promise for some
form of continued employment on the basis of the personnel policies
or practices of an employer, the employee's longevity of service,
actions or communications by the employer reflecting assurances of
continued employment, and the practices of the industry in which the
employee was engaged. 7 No specific promise, written or oral, that
discharge would only be for cause was required to provide job protec-
tion. Recognition that this evidence could establish the existence of an
actual agreement between the parties requiring good cause for termi-
nation of plaintiff's employment obviously was less novel than recog-
nition of a new rule requiring just cause for termination of
employment. But, by making the question a factual issue for the jury
to decide, the court made it more difficult for anyone to accuse it of
judicial activism.
Earlier, in Cleary v. American Airlines,8 a different district of the
California Court of Appeals had held that a contractual protection
against discharge without cause could be derived from the employee's
long service and the expressed policy of the employer.8 9 No express
agreement, oral or written, to that effect was required. The length of
83. 292 N.W.2d at 890.
84. Id. at 904-06 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 885.
86. 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981).
87. 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927.
88. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
89. 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
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service and the employer's expressed policy created a form of estoppel
against discharging an employee without just cause.' °
In 1983, the Supreme Court of Minnesota was equally relaxed in its
requirements of the evidence necessary to present a jury question of
whether an oral contract of employment for an indefinite term could
be modified by the employer's subsequent issuance of an employee
handbook which discussed, among numerous other things, job security
and discipline.91 The court affirmed a jury verdict in favor of an
employee who had been discharged without observance of the proce-
dures set out in the handbook.9
2
In 1985, the Supreme Court of New Jersey decided Woolley v. Hoff-
man-La Roche, Inc. 93 After noting that the principles of contract law
applicable to long-term employment contracts had no relevancy in a
case involving a policy manual,94 the court concluded that the job
security provisions in a manual constituted an unilateral offer which
an employee accepted by continuing to work.95 Employee reliance
upon those provisions is to be presumed, with the consequence of
employer responsibility, even though there is no proof that the
employee read the manual or relied upon it in continuing his or her
work.96
The significant change in standards for determining whether a con-
tract of employment is terminable without cause is made apparent by
comparing successive annotations in American Law Reports A previ-
ously quoted 1975 annotation states:
Despite its sometimes harsh operation and the obvious opportunities for
abuse it affords an unscrupulous employer, few legal principles would
seem to be better settled than the broad generality that an employment
contract for an indefinite term is regarded as an employment at will
which may be terminated at any time by either party for any reason or
for no reason at all. 9 7
A 1982 annotation states:
As to the employment contract, some courts have been willing to recog-
nize an obligation on the part of an employer not to terminate an
90. 1dL
91. Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983).
92. I&d at 631.
93. 99 NJ. 284, 491 A.2d 1257 (1985).
94. 491 A.2d at 1263.
95. Id at 1267.
96. Id at 1268 n.10. The lack of detail concerning other terms of employment-its duration,
wages, precise service to be rendered, hours of work-were held not to prevent enforcement of
the job security provision. Id at 1269.
97. Annotation, supra note 21.
737
Washington Law Review
employee for an indefinite term arbitrarily where a policy or program on
the part of the employer is claimed to have restricted the employer's
traditional right of termination at will.98
2. Disclaimers as a Limitation on Contract Theory
A contract theory for job protection has limitations because
employers may specifically provide in application forms or other
employment documents that employment is at will or that policy
statements in a personnel manual have no contractual significance and
are not guarantees of treatment pursuant to those general policies
stated. Courts have been willing to give effect to such employer dis-
claimers. In Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,99 the employee had signed
an application for employment which provided:
In consideration of my employment, I agree to conform to the rules and
regulations of Sears, Roebuck and Co., and my employment and com-
pensation can be terminated with or without cause, and with or without
notice, at any time, at the option of either the Company or myself. I
understand that no store manager or representative of Sears, Roebuck
and Co., other than the president or vice president of the Company, has
any authority to enter into any agreement for employment for any speci-
fied period of time, or to make any agreement contrary to the
foregoing. o
The Sixth Circuit held that because the clause governed termination
of employment there could not be an implied contractual provision
covering the same subject.101
More importantly, the Supreme Court of Michigan later held that
an employer that had not expressly reserved the right to discharge at
will might unilaterally change its policy to one of termination-at-will,
provided it gave the affected employees reasonable notice of the policy
change."0 2 The court explained that, under Toussaint, written person-
nel policies are not enforceable because they have been offered and
accepted as unilateral contracts but because of the benefit the
employer derives from such a policy. If the employer changes its pol-
icy to at-will employment, it loses the benefit of work environment of
assured employees. The court concluded that once the employer loses
98. Annotation, Modern Status of Rule That Employer May Discharge At- Will Employee for
Any Reason, 12 A.L.R.4th 544, 550 (1982).
99. 790 F.2d 453 (6th Cir. 1986).
100. Id. at 456.
101. Id. at 462.
102. In re Certified Question, 432 Mich. 438, 443 N.W.2d 112 (1989).
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that benefit, there is no longer a reason to enforce a discharge-for-
cause policy. 103
Other courts have enforced disclaimer provisions in employment
manuals." This approach is sound if a court considers the problem
before it to be simply a matter of what law should be applied to a
contract made by parties who enjoy equal bargaining power. If, how-
ever, the recent revisions of the employment-at-will doctrine were
prompted by recognition that employees do not enjoy equal bargaining
power with employers and a conviction that they deserve legal protec-
tion from arbitrary and unjust loss of employment, giving effect to dis-
claimers is inconsistent with the undertaking. Whether an employee
who received oral assurances of job security gave consideration in
addition to performance of services, or whether the manual should be
viewed as an offer of a unilateral contract, are purely academic. They
are so far from the forces behind revisions of employment law that
they should be ignored in making that revision. 10 5
The view that enforcing disclaimers in employment contracts is bad
policy has gained acceptance by the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws. Section 4(b) of the current draft of
the Uniform Employment Termination Act permits an agreement to
terminate the employment of an employee without good cause only if
that agreement provides for severance payments for periods fixed by
the employee's length of service. 106
3. An Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
According to one tabulation, courts in eighteen states indicate that
they will not recognize the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
employment contracts, whereas only twelve states indicate that they
will recognize the covenant. 107 Those courts recognizing the applica-
bility of the covenant to employment contracts find support in the
103. 443 N.W.2d at 119.
104. See, eg., Doe v. First Nat'l Bank, 865 F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1989); Castiglione v. Johns
Hopkins Hosp., 69 Md. App. 325, 517 A.2d 786 (1986), cert denied, 309 Md. 325, 523 A.2d
1013 (1987).
105. For an excellent comment critical of views permitting unilateral changes in employee
handbooks and arguing for rejection of tests of additional consideration or mutuality of
obligation, see Comment, Unilateral Modifcation of Employment Handbooks Further
Encroachments on the Employment-At-Will Doctrine, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 197 (1990).
106. Uniform Employment Termination Act (Discussion Draft 1990), reported in 9A Lab.
Rd. Rep. (BNA) 540:21 (Jan. 1991).
107. State Rulings Chart, 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 505:51-52 (Aug. 1989). Professor St.
Antoine, a highly respected authority on the subject of unjust discharge, suggests that the
traditional contract doctrine of good faith and fair dealing has not been utilized as a catch-all
protection against arbitrary conduct on the part of a contracting person. Therefore, the doctrine
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Restatement of Contracts. Section 205 of the Restatement of Contracts
(Second) provides: "Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of
good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.""1 8
The applicability of the section to at-will employment contracts is sup-
ported by the Reporter's Notes to section 205, in which the first case
cited is Fortune v. National Cash Register Co. to As the notes of the
restatement Reporter indicate, in that case the Supreme Court of Mas-
sachusetts applied an implied covenant of good faith to an employ-
ment contract terminable at will.110
Recognizing the implied covenant could provide very comprehen-
sive and effective job protection if the covenant were held to require
the employer to have "good cause" or "just cause" for termination of
employment. In that case, the implied covenant could establish for all
employees a standard of protection equal to that enjoyed by persons
employed under the terms of collective bargaining agreements. Such a
holding would also permit an employer to obtain services of the qual-
ity and type that were justifiably expected at the establishment of the
employment relationship. If, however, the covenant requires only that
the employer have a subjective good faith belief that the appropriate
discipline for a supposed infraction was termination of employment,
errors of supervision are tolerated despite the harm imposed on the
employee, and the protection provided for employees is much reduced.
Most courts recognizing an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing do not hold employers to the requirement of establishing good
cause for terminating employment. The early decisions in Petermann
v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 39611 and Monge v.
Beebe Rubber Co. I 2 were cases in which the trier of fact could find
that the terminations were based on improper reasons that constituted
bad faith. The jury found that the attempted deprivation of commis-
sions on sales in Fortune was in bad faith. 3 Two of the early wrong-
ful discharge cases decided by California Courts of Appeals did not
would not ordinarily apply to unjust dismissal or termination of a contract. St. Antoine, A Seed
Germinates: Unjust Discharge Reform Heads Toward Full Flower, 67 NEB. L. REv. 56, 63 (1988).
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979); see also U.C.C. § 1-203, 1
U.L.A. 109 (1989) ("Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith
in its performance or enforcement.").
109. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977); see supra text accompanying notes 40-41
(discussing Fortune).
110. 364 N.E.2d at 1255-56.
111. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959); see supra text accompanying notes 23-24
(discussing Petermann).
112. 316 A.2d 549 (1974); see supra text accompanying notes 29-31 (discussing Monge).
113. 364 N.E.2d at 1255.
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require the employers to establish just cause for the terminations, but
instead placed the burden of proving unjust termination on the
employee, recognizing as a defense the employer's proof of good faith
and fair dealing.114 Other courts, giving employees even less protec-
tion, have held that the covenant does not protect employees from "no
cause" terminations and gives protection only against discharges that
violate public policy.1 ' Decisions limiting the application of the cove-
nant do not expand the protection enjoyed by employees.
Fortunately, some courts have taken a less limited view of the cove-
nant. For example, the Supreme Court of Montana held in 1982 that
proof that the employee was discharged without warning and an
opportunity for hearing created an issue for the jury as to whether the
employer breached the covenant."1 6 Two years later, the same court
held that widely divergent versions of an employee's work perform-
ance and the reasons for her termination presented issues of fact con-
cerning whether she was fired for cause." 7 The Supreme Court of
Idaho recently stated that placing an employee on part-time status
because she used accumulated sick leave violated an implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing."' And, while the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts was unwilling to hold that a discharge of an at-will
employee without cause violated the covenant, the court did hold that
with respect to future compensation for past service, the employee
need not prove an absence of good faith."19
In a recent decision, Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 120 the Supreme
Court of California gave recognition to the covenant as a protection
against wrongful discharge, but drastically limited the damages which
may be recovered for its breach. Prior decisions by the California
Court of Appeals had permitted the recovery of tort damages for
114. Pugh v. Sees Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981); Cleary v.
American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980). In Pugh, the court
expressly stated that "good cause" in the context of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing was
quite different from the standard in determining the propriety of an employee's termination
under a contract for a specified term. 171 Cal. Rptr. at 928.
115. See eg., Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025
(1985); see also Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24 (Okla. 1989); Brockmeyer v. Dun &
Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983).
116. Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063 (1982); see also Gates v.
Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 205 Mont. 304, 668 P.2d 213 (1983).
117. Dare v. Montana Petroleum Mktg. Co., 212 Mont. 274, 687 P.2d 1015 (1984).
118. Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 116 Idaho 622, 778 P.2d 744 (1989), modified on
other grounds Sorensen v. Comm Tek, Inc., 118 Idaho 664, 799 P.2d 70 (1990).
119. Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 384 Mass. 659, 429 N.E.2d 21 (1981).
120. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
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breach of the covenant.12 1 Commentators on the law of California
also considered a tort cause of action for bad faith discharge to be the
law of California. 122 The majority in Foley reviewed cases involving a
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the insurance
context, an area in which the court had approved the award of tort
damages. The majority believed that the inequality of bargaining
power between a claimant and an insurer was greater than the inequal-
ity of bargaining power between parties to employment contracts and
that opportunity to profit by breach was greater for insurers than it is
for employers. 1
2 3
The majority in Foley concluded that awarding tort damages for
breach of the implied covenant was inappropriate for employment
cases because, among other reasons, it involved a standardless inquiry
into whether improper motivation and bad faith produced employer
decisions to terminate. 124 The court therefore limited the remedies for
breach of the covenant to contract damages, explaining that the diver-
sity of possible solutions to problems it had examined revealed "the
confusion that occurs when we look outside the realm of contract law
in attempting to fashion remedies for a breach of a contract provi-
sion. '"  Moreover, the court specifically stated that breach of the
implied covenant cannot be based on a claim that a discharge was
made without good cause, because to do so would eviscerate the
employment-at-will provision found in the California Labor Code.1 26
It did, however, remand the case for determination of whether the
termination of employment violated an implied-in-fact contract not to
discharge except for good cause even though the plaintiff had been
employed for only six years and nine months.127
Of course, a covenant of good faith and fair dealing should permit
termination of employment for any reason consistent with furthering
the employer's business needs. Those needs and operational require-
ments could constitute the standards for determining whether a
breach had occurred. Moreover, as pointed out by Justice Kaufman in
dissent, the duty to deal fairly and in good faith with the other party to
a contract is a duty imposed by law, not one arising from the terms of
the contract; it is a duty which is nonconsensual in origin and there-
121. See 765 P.2d at 403-06 (Broussard, J., concurring in part).
122. Id. at 405-06 (Broussard, J., concurring in part).
123. Id. at 394-96.
124. Id. at 400-01.
125. Id. at 401.
126. Id. at 400 n.39.
127. Id. at 375, 401.
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fore much like duties imposed by tort law. 128 Granting tort damages
for its breach would not defeat the reasonable expectations of an
employer in entering into the employment relationship unless power to
terminate without cause or justification is assumed to be a norm recog-
nized by both parties. Comment a to section 205 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts states: "Good faith performance or enforcement
of a contract emphasizes faithfuilness to an agreed common purpose
and consistency with the justified expectations of the other party; it
excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as involving 'bad
faith' because they violate community standards of decency, fairness
or reasonableness."
' 129
If the remedies available for wrongful discharge are to be deter-
mined by principles of contract law, a breach of the covenant should
be found in discharges violating community standards of decency, fair-
ness, or reasonableness.13° Tort damages are more compatible with
and suitable for remedying such a breach than the commercial expec-
tations of the parties upon making the contract. One cannot avoid the
suspicion that the California court's determination that tort damages
cannot be recovered for breach of the covenant sprang more from a
concern for the large recoveries obtained by plaintiffs, including
awards of punitive damages, than from concern for consistency with
the doctrinal principles of commercial contract law.131
128. Id at 413 (Kaufman, J., dissenting in part).
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 comment a (1981).
130. Cf id § 205 comment d, illustration 6 ('4 contracts to perform services for B for such
compensation 'as you, in your sole judgment, may decide is reasonable.' After A has performed
the services, B refuses to make any determination of the value of the services. A is entitled to
their value as determined by a court.").
The illustration indicates that contractual conferral of complete discretion does not immunize
the party with such power from judicial supervision.
131. In California, between 1982 and 1986, employees won more than 70% of the cases tried
before juries; the average total award was $652,100. A survey conducted by a San Francisco law
firm indicated that punitive damage awards in California averaged $494,000. Gould, Stemming
the Wrongful Discharge Tide. A Case for Arbitration, 13 EMPLOYEE REL. L.. 404, 405-06
(1987).
A RAND Corporation study of 120 California wrongful termination cases indicated that in
spite of large awards in some cases and a high success rate, the typical plaintiff receives damages
equivalent to a half year's severance pay. The average net payment (minus fees) to successful
plaintiffs was $188,520 and the median payment was $74,500. Defense legal fees and expenses
averaged $83,862 per case, and combined legal fees of both sides averaged $164,484. J.
DERTOUZOs, E. HOLLAND & P. EBENER, THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF
WRONGFUL TERMINATION 19, 39, 40 table 16 (1988).
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B. Out of the Grab-Bag: Negligent Performance of Contract Duties
A few courts have held that an employer may be liable for negligent
performance of contract duties, such as a contractual duty to warn an
employee of potential dismissal for unsatisfactory performance, 132 or
negligent failure to investigate the facts concerning a discharge for
insubordination, disruptive conduct, and poor performance.1 33
C. The Public Policy Exception
Courts have used tort theories to provide job protection from unjust
terminations of employment which involve possible violations of or
conflicts with public policies. Cases with violations or conflicts
involve (1) discharges for refusing to violate criminal or civil laws, (2)
discharges for having performed civic duties or statutory obligations,
(3) discharges for asserting statutory or constitutional rights or privi-
leges, (4) discharges for socially desirable performances not required
by law, and (5) discharges for what are recognized as socially repre-
hensible reasons. The degree of conflict with public policy in these
categories is apparent. The exception thus affords courts broad discre-
tion in deciding the extent to which they will exercise control over
employer decisions to terminate employment. The exception also pro-
vides courts with protection against charges that judges have set them-
selves up as qualified to review and reverse decisions made by business
managers.
1. Discharges for Refusing to Violate Criminal or Civil Laws
Cases in which a remedy is provided for discharges for refusing to
violate criminal or civil laws are exemplified by early cases involving
discharges of employees: for refusing to commit perjury; 134 for refus-
ing to engage in price fixing; 135 and for bringing repeated violations of
state food, drug, and cosmetic act to the attention of the employer.1 36
132. Chamberlain v. Bissell, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1067 (W.D. Mich. 1982). But cf. Lieber v.
Union Carbide Corp., Nuclear Div., 577 F. Supp. 562 (E.D. Tenn. 1983) (employee had neither a
written nor an implied agreement with the employer that employee receive an annual
performance review).
133. Crenshaw v. Bozeman Deaconess Hosp., 213 Mont. 488, 693 P.2d 487 (1984).
134. Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184,
344 P.2d 25 (1959); see supra text accompanying notes 23-24 (discussing Petermann).
135. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839
(1980).
136. Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980); cf
Girabaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099
(1985) (discharge for reporting shipment of adulterated milk is against California public policy
and wrongful).
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As expected, a substantial number of subsequent cases set aside termi-
nations of employment for refusing to violate laws.137 There are, how-
ever, decisions denying relief to those terminated for refusing to
violate laws. For example, in one case a court denied relief to a super-
visor of nurses discharged for transferring practical nurses from a hos-
pital emergency room as required by state law.138 In another case, the
court denied relief to a long distance truck driver discharged for refus-
ing to violate federal regulations by driving an excess number of hours
or by falsifying his reports. 13 9 In a related manner, some courts have
concluded that the impropriety to which the employee objected did
not sufficiently involve a public interest to render termination of
employment improper. Thus a professional employee's objection to
performing research that she believed would require breach of profes-
sional ethics did not sufficiently implicate the public interest."4 Simi-
larly, the public interest was not involved in a discharge of a chemist
for informing his employer that it was violating, on a large-scale basis,
its legal and societal obligations."'
2. Discharges for Performing Civic Duties
At an early date, the Supreme Court of Oregon gave protection to
an employee discharged because she had performed the civic duty of
serving on a jury." Of course, it seems unlikely that this was because
of a recently discovered problem of obtaining jurors. The Oregon
courts had functioned in a satisfactory way for many years before. In
essence, the court rejected the employer's business judgment that a
loyal employee should have asked to be excused from jury duty. It
obscured that fact by characterizing the employee's termination as
thwarting the will of the community. 143 The Supreme Court of South
Carolina held that the discharge of an employee because she honored a
subpoena to appear at an employment security commission hearing
violated the public policy of that state and created an exception to the
137. See, eg., Woodson v. AMF Leisureland Centers, Inc., 842 F.2d 699 (3d Cir. 1988);
Lorenz v. Martin Marietta Corp., 802 P.2d 1146 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990); Coman v. Thomas Mfg.
Co., 325 N.C. 172, 381 S.E.2d 445 (1989); Shaw v. Russell Trucking Co., 542 F. Supp. 776
(W.D. Pa. 1982).
138. Trought v. Richardson, 78 N.C. App. 758, 338 S.E.2d 617 (1986). The court held that
whether the transfer was required by state law was a matter for interpretation rather than a clear
violation. 338 S.E.2d at 619.
139. Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 91 N.C. App. 327, 371 S.E.2d 731 (1988), rev'd, 325 N.C.
172, 381 S.E.2d 445 (1989).
140. Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 NJ. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980).
141. Phung v. Waste Management, Inc., 23 Ohio St. 3d 100, 491 N.E.2d 1114 (1986).
142. Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
143. 536 P.2d at 516.
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state's employment-at-will doctrine.1" The decision seems more
responsive to problems of unjustified discharges from employment
than to problems of obtaining compliance with subpoenas. The
Supreme Court of New Hampshire permitted recovery for wrongful
discharge in part on the basis that a store manager had acted in
accordance with the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)
when he did not require employees to travel at night, unprotected, to
the bank with substantial sums of money.' 45 This stretch of OSHA's
protections seems more related to providing job security than provid-
ing physically safe employment conditions.
3. Discharges for Socially Desirable Performances
More problematic is the decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois,
which concluded that a managerial employee stated a cause of action
for wrongful discharge because he supplied information to local law
enforcement officers indicating that another employee might be violat-
ing a state criminal law and agreed to assist in the investigation and
trial if requested. 46 The employee's conduct was socially desirable
even though it could result in personnel problems and friction in the
employer's operations. 47 As the dissenting justices pointed out, it was
doubtful whether the public policy was served because no statute
existed requiring the plaintiff to supply such information, nor did
plaintiff allege that a crime had in fact been committed.148 The inter-
est in job security, however, was well served.
Other courts have not been as willing to use a public policy disguise
to provide job protection. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held that discharging an employee because he was
going to report to higher corporate authorities that business was
acquired through kickbacks did not constitute a violation of Maryland
public policy or an abusive discharge. 49 Much earlier, a divided
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied relief to a salesman of a steel
company who alleged that he was fired because he had reported to a
corporate officer, who was also a personal friend, that the company
was marketing steel tubing for a purpose for which the tubing had not
been adequately tested.150
144. Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc., 287 S.C. 219, 337 S.E.2d 213 (1985).
145. Cloutier v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 121 N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140 (1981).
146. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Il1. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
147. 421 N.E.2d at 885.
148. 421 N.E.2d at 884 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
149. Adler v. American Standard Corp., 830 F.2d 1303 (4th Cir. 1987).
150. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974).
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4. Discharges for Asserting Statutory or Constitutional Rights
Among the earliest cases establishing exceptions, to the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine are cases in which an employee was discharged
for exercising a statutory right to apply for workers' compensation.151
These cases involve an intolerable interference with the employee's
rights against the offending employer. Not all courts, however, have
recognized such a claim absent a provision in the applicable workers'
compensation act explicitly providing for such a suit.'52 The Third
Circuit held that the discharge of an employee for refusal to take a
polygraph test would be a discharge in violation of public policy
because of a Pennsylvania law making it a misdemeanor to require an
employee to take such a test.'53 As with the workers' compensation
claim cases, the discharge intolerably interferes with the employee's
statutory protection. The Third Circuit also forged ahead in establish-
ing job protection based on constitutional rights in Novosel v. Nation-
wide Insurance Co., 54 holding that discharging an employee who had
refused to participate in lobbying efforts sponsored by the employer
violated the employee's first amendment rights and therefore was con-
trary to the public policy of Pennsylvania. Satisfaction of the usual
requirement of state action for assertion of constitutional rights was
waived for the purpose of providing job protection in what the court
referred to as the considerable ferment surrounding the employment-
at-will doctrine. 51
151. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 IMI. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Frampton v. Central
Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644,
245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); see also Smith v. Atlas Off-Shore-Boat Serv., 653 F.2d 105"7 (5th Cir.
1981) (holding that an employer should not be allowed to discharge an employee because the
employee had filed suit against the employer under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988)).
152. See Green v. Amerada-Hess Corp., 612 F.2d 212 (5th Cir.), cer. denied, 464 U.S. 1039
(1980), and cases cited therein.
153. Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979); see also Cordle v.
General Hugh Mercer Corp., 325 S.E.2d 111 (W. Va. 1984) (contrary to public policy of West
Virginia to require employee to submit to a polygraph test as a condition of employment).
Washington has a similar statute making it a misdemeanor to require'an employee to take a
polygraph test. The statute provides for recovery of a civil penalty of $500 by any employee or
applicant required to take such a test, but makes no provision for suit for damages for wrongful
discharge. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.44.130-.135 (West 1990).
In most cases reliance on state laws will no longer be necessary given the enactment of the
federal Employee Polygraph Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (1988), which specifically
provides that an employer who violates the statute may be liable for legal and equitable relief,
including employment, reinstatement, promotion, and payment of lost wages and benefits. Ia
§ 2005(c).
154. 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983).
155. Id. at 896. 900.
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5. Discharges for Socially Reprehensible Reasons
Cases involving actionable discharges from employment on the
grounds of social reprehensibility rest on a less secure basis than those
cases conflicting with legally supported principles. Even though most
people would condemn an employer's action, such condemnation does
not provide an effective camouflage for providing job protection
because the court must join in the condemnation. Nevertheless, some
courts have provided that protection. The early decision of the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire in Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 1
56
in which a married woman was discharged because she would not date
her foreman after working on the night shift, involves such a condem-
nation of supervisory use of power. The same court held actionable
the discharge of an employee because a company official desired
"revenge" against him, in part because of his refusal to lie to the com-
pany's president on the official's behalf." 7 The Supreme Court of Ore-
gon held that an employer could be liable for discharging an employee
who refused to sign a false and potentially defamatory letter about a
former co-employee because it conflicted with the societal obligation
not to defame others.15 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
concluded that the Supreme Court of Arkansas would find the dis-
charge of a woman contrary to public policy because she would not
"sleep with" her foreman, even though such conduct may not techni-
cally violate the law against prostitution.'59 Similarly, the Arizona
Supreme Court concluded that discharging a nurse who would not
"moon" (expose her buttocks) on a camping and rafting trip was
against public policy even though under the circumstances such expo-
sure would not necessarily violate a law against indecent exposure.
60
On the other hand, an Indiana Court of Appeals refused to find
wrongful the discharge of a public works inspector fired because, dur-
ing the course of his duties, he became aware of a possibly meretri-
cious relationship between the board's president and the executive
secretary. 16 ' The Oregon Supreme Court rejected the wrongful dis-
charge claim of an employee who alleged that his employment was
156. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974); see supra text accompanying notes 29-31
(discussing Monge).
157. Cilley v. New Hampshire Ball Bearings, Inc., 128 N.H. 401, 514 A.2d 818 (1986).
158. Delaney v. Taco Time Int'l, Inc., 297 Or. 10, 681 P.2d 114 (1984). The court explained
that article I, section 10 of the Oregon Constitution recognized such an obligation. 681 P.2d at
118.
159. Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202, 1205 (8th Cir. 1984).
160. Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025, 1035 (1985).
161. Hillenbrand v. City of Evansville, 457 N.E.2d 236, 237 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
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terminated because he would not give up an after-work relationship
with a female employee.162 The Seventh Circuit concluded that a dis-
charge for consulting an attorney after receiving a letter of reprimand
did not constitute an actionable violation of the public policy of Wis-
consin. 6 3 The Seventh Circuit also decided that Wisconsin's public
policies were not violated by the discharge of the president of a subsid-
iary corporation so that his superior in the holding corporation could
acquire what was formerly the president's income.' The court
explained that greed is at the foundation of much economic activity
and that it is not the sort of prohibited motive in the management of a
business that will support a tort action. 65
The wavering line in cases involving violations of 'or conflicts with
public policy are best understood as reflecting the differences in the
courts' desire to provide the job protection they believe employees and
society deserve. The cases reflect variations in the courts' willingness
to move in the direction of job protection and different evaluations of
whether the camouflage provides sufficient protection against charges
that judges have legislated a principle requiring just cause for termina-
tion of employment. Courts feel the greatest safety when the employee
is discharged for refusing to violate laws; courts feel most exposed
when the employee is discharged for merely socially reprehensible
reasons.
D. Legislation
Legislation would provide more certain and effective protection
against unjust discharge than slow development of job protection in
judicial decisions. Statutory law is not limited or confined by develop-
ment within a particular factual context. A well drafted statute offers
more immediate, comprehensive, and definitive protection. Statutes
are more easily understood by employees than the law extracted from
judicial opinions.
Statutes may contain exceptions and limitations which cannot be
developed or justified on the basis of general propositions underlying
judicial decisions. Thus, they may exclude employers with a small
number of employees from their coverage, avoiding undesirable intru-
sions on personal relationships between an individual employer and
his or her employees. Statutes may fix probationary periods during
162. Patton v. J.C. Penney Co., 301 Or. 117, 719 P.2d 854, 857 (1986).
163. Beam v. IPCO Corp., 838 F.2d 242, 247 (7th Cir. 1988).
164. Kumpf v. Steinhaus, 779 F.2d 1323 (7th Cir. 1985).
165. Id at 1326.
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which cause for discharge is not required. High-level managerial
employees may be excluded from its coverage. Statutes may define
what constitutes cause for discharge. They may also define what lesser
forms of discipline must be based on just cause. New forums and new
procedures for more expeditious resolution of disputes may be estab-
lished. Enforcement responsibilities may be assigned to an administra-
tive agency, avoiding an increased burden on the courts.
Alternatively, statutes may provide for arbitration, by either state-
employed arbitrators or private arbitrators selected by the parties. If
private arbitration is used, provision may be made for payment by the
state of arbitration fees and expenses. Statutes may establish state-
provided mediation services prior to hearing of a dispute concerning
whether a discharge was for just cause. Statutes may also establish
appropriate and permissible remedies for unjust discharges. Finally,
any other questions which may arise in providing protection from
unjust discharge can receive dispositive resolution in a statute. 166
Recognizing the importance of providing job protection and the
need for a statute governing unjust discharges, the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws have drafted a Uniform Employment Termina-
tion Act. The Commission has not yet approved the Act. A drafting
committee, for which Professor St. Antoine is Reporter, has produced
seven drafts, the last of which was produced after a meeting in
November 1990.167 In the most recent draft, section 2(a) of the Act
provides that an employer may not terminate the employment of an
employee without good cause. 168 The draft offers three options for
enforcement: arbitration, administrative proceedings, and judicial pro-
ceedings. 169 The current draft provides that if the employee alleges
that a termination was without good cause, the employer must pro-
166. For excellent discussions of proposals for wrongful termination of employment statutes,
see Grodin, Toward a Wrongful Termination Statute for California, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 135
(1990); St. Antoine, supra note 107, at 70-81.
167. Uniform Employment Termination Act (Discussion Draft 1990), reported in 9A Lab.
Rel. Rep. (BNA) 540:21 (Jan. 1991).
168. Id. § 2(a), at 540:25. Section 1(4) defines good cause:
"Good cause" means (i) a reasonable basis for termination of an employee's employment
in view of relevant factors and circumstances, which include the employee's duties and
responsibilities; the employee's conduct, job performance, and employment record; and the
appropriateness of termination for the conduct involved, or (ii) the good faith exercise of
business judgment by the employer as to the setting of economic goals and determining
methods to achieve those goals, organizing or reorganizing operations, discontinuing or
divesting operations or parts of operations, determining the size and composition of the
work force, and determining and changing performance standards for positions.
Id.
169. Id.
Vol. 66:719, 1991
The Law of Wrongful Discharge
ceed first to present its case. The employee, however, has the ultimate
burden of proving that the termination was prohibited. 170 A written
agreement signed by an employer and employee may authorize the
employer to discharge the employee without good cause if severance
payments are provided at specified rates of monthly pay for various
years of service. 17 1 The record of adoptions of other Model and Uni-
form acts suggests that when completed, adoption of the Model
Employment Termination Act will depend upon whether there are
lobbies or pressure groups to shepherd it through the legislative
process.172
One might think that a proposal providing employees with job
security would have great political appeal, assuring the adoption of the
Uniform Employment Termination Act by numerous states. At the
present time, however, only Montana has enacted a general law pro-
viding protection against wrongful discharges from employment. 73
Proposals for similar legislation have been made in other states, 7 4 but
they have not been successful. The reasons for the absence of legisla-
tive action are found in the nature of the legislative process.
Generally speaking, statutes are not enacted because they provide
good and desirable improvements in existing law. A statute is enacted
because groups with sufficient political power have decided that they
desire the enactment of that statute. The supporters must have polit-
ical power sufficient to overcome the opposition to its enactment. '7
The employees who would benefit most from enactment of a statute
providing protection against unjust discharge are persons in private
employment who are not represented by a union. These unorganized
employees are exactly that-unorganized, They do not constitute an
effective lobbying group, and they have no organization to act for
them in achieving enactment of such a law.
One might think that labor unions would seek enactment of statu-
tory protections against unjust discharge. In fact, since 1987 the Exec-
170. Id § 6(e).
171. Id. § 4(b).
172. See Peck, The Role of the Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 48 MINN.
L. REV. 265, 284-85 (1963).
173. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-901 to-914 (1989); 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 567:5-7 (Jan.
1991). The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has also enacted a statute which provides one
month's salary plus an additional week of pay for each year of service for employees whose
employment has been terminated without cause. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, §§ 185a-191 (1985 &
Supp. 1988).
174. See Grodin, supra note 166, at 141-42 and n.44.
175. For a more elaborate discussion of this view and succeeding comments on the legislative
process, see Peck, supra note 77, at 6-9.
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utive Council of the AFL-CIO has lobbied in favor of expanding
exceptions to the termination-at-will doctrine.1 76 But one of the most
persuasive organizing arguments unions have is that they will bring
due process and protection against arbitrary action to the work
place. 177 Predictably, many union leaders would believe that enact-
ment of such a law would undermine the very reasons for having labor
unions. Employers have experienced lobbyist representatives at all
state legislatures, and their initial reaction is to oppose attempts to
revise the employment-at-will doctrine. Plaintiffs' attorneys are also
likely to resist enactment of a statute if it establishes procedures which
would threaten a practice based on contingent fees. Given organized
opposition, the attempts by individual legislators to support enactment
of such a law will almost certainly be defeated.
Valuable as the judicially developed protections against unjust ter-
mination of employment have been and will be, their greatest service
may be that of bringing about enactment of statutes providing that
protection. As the discussion of the Foley decision 179 reveals, employ-
ers have been subjected to substantial judgments of punitive damages
and damages for emotional distress. The uncertainties of judicially
developed law and the exposure to large damage awards and legal
expenses may induce employers, which do have effective lobbying
organizations, to seek the adoption of a statute governing unjust dis-
charges. This appears to be what happened in Montana. The Mon-
tana Supreme Court recognized early and comprehensively the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, leading employers to
seek both relief and certainty through the enactment of the first state
statute governing wrongful termination of employment.'8 °
Judicial activism may stimulate legislative consideration of
problems otherwise overlooked because of what Guido Calabresi has
176. Hauserman & Maranto, The Union Substitution Hypothesis Revisited: Do Judicially
Created Exceptions To The Termination-At-Will Doctrine Hurt Unions?, 72 MARQ. L. REv. 317
(1989).
177. J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW
AND REALITY 99, table 4-15 (1976).
178. Experience in Great Britain suggests that union leaders err in making that assessment.
PROTECTING UNORGANIZED EMPLOYEES AGAINST UNJUST DISCHARGE 46,48-49 (J. Stieber &
J. Blackburn eds. 1983) (comments of B.A. Hepple, Chairman of Industrial Tribunals, England).
Hepple's suggestion is that unorganized employees are likely to approach a union to obtain
assistance in asserting rights upon a law which they know exists but with which they are
unfamiliar.
179. See supra notes 120-27 and accompanying text.
180. Schramm, Montana Employment Law and the 1987 Wrongful Discharge From
Employment Act: A New Order Begins, 51 MONT. L. REV. 94, 94-96 (1990).
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identified as legislative inertia.'' Recognizing that judicial decisions
may perform a catalytic fumction does not mean that the law produced
should be outrageous or unacceptable. Nevertheless, it would be
appropriate for courts to consider Calabresi's suggestion that, as a pro-
tection against bad results, a court should put the burden of overcom-
ing the effects of its decision on those with ready access to legislative
reconsideration.18 2
Courts should also recognize that when legislative attention is
directed toward new solutions for problems, legislators will review and
defer to judicially developed solutions. After all, legislators recognize
the inevitable fact that the laws they enact must be interpreted and
applied by the judiciary and that the judiciary has greater insights into
problems which may arise in enforcement of statutes. Nor need courts
fear that if they produce an extremely good change in the law that
there will be no legislative reaction. Certainly, a major change in the
employment-at-will doctrine will pressure politically adept employers,
leading them to seek reconsideration in the legislative process. Judi-
cial changes in the law of products liability have already prompted
such a reaction by manufacturers.
183
III. DEVELOPMENTS IN WASHINGTON
The Washington Supreme Court accepted Wood's employment-at-
will doctrine without question.'14 The Washington court's departure
from the employment-at-will doctrine has followed the development of
the law in other states, but with timidity. At the present time, any
enthusiasm the Washington Court had for developing a new law pro-
viding job protection for employees has waned. As a result, Washing-
ton employees enjoy less protection against unjust discharge than
employees in more progressive jurisdictions.
The Washington court's reluctance to dismantle the employment-
at-will doctrine is at odds with the position of leadership it assumed
and still occupies in other areas of judicial modernization of common
law rules. The court was, for example, a leader in providing protec-
181. G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 120-45 (1982).
Calabresi's comments were directed to replacement of obsolescent statutes, but obviously they
are applicable to revising obsolete common law rules.
182. IML at 125.
183. Peck, Washington's Partial Rejection and Modification of the Common Law Rule of Joint
and Several Liability, 62 WASH. L. REV. 233, 239-42 (1987); Talmadge, Washington's Product
Liability Act, 5 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 1 (1981).
184. See Lasser v. Grunbaum Bros. Furniture Co., 46 Wash. 2d 408, 410, 281 P.2d 832, 834
(1955); Davidson v. Mackall-Paine Veneer Co., 149 Wash. 685, 688, 271 P. 878, 879 (1928).
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tion to consumers from defective products. 18 5 The court did not hesi-
tate when its cost/benefit analysis led it to require the use of a test
procedure not established by the standards of specialists in ophthal-
mology.' 8 6 Nor would the court permit the medical profession to
determine whether the risk of a procedure should be disclosed to a
patient.1 87 Employees need protection as much as consumers and
patients. This is particularly true today when the proportion of the
work force protected by collective bargaining agreements has been
dramatically reduced and still is shrinking.' 8 But as will be seen, the
court has failed to provide protection comparable to that which it has
given to patients and consumers.
A. An Early Unrecognized Exception
In 1965, the Supreme Court of Washington made an exception to
the employment-at-will doctrine in Krystad v. Lau. "9 In that case, the
court held that employees discharged because of their union member-
ship were entitled to damages for lost wages, an order reinstating them
to their former positions, and an injunction against any further inter-
ference with their union activities. The court concluded that the
employment-at-will doctrine did not govern the case because the pol-
icy statement of Washington's little Norris-LaGuardia Act 9°--an act
to prohibit the issuance of injunctions in labor disputes-provided that
employees should be free from employer interference with their efforts
185. The Washington court was one of the first to impose a strict liability to consumers
without privity of contract for defective food and drink. Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash.
622, 135 P. 633 (1913). Its decision in Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409
(1932), was a precursor of the strict liability to consumers recognized in RESrATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). That section was accepted by the court at an early date in
Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wash. 2d 522, 452 P.2d 729 (1969). And the court has recently
shown great reluctance to accept a legislative attempt to cut back on the protection it has built
for consumers. Falk v. Keene Corp., 113 Wash. 2d 645, 782 P.2d 974 (1989).
The court's decision in Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984),
went beyond the usual leader, California, in providing a market share remedy for women who
had been injured because their mothers had taken DES to prevent miscarriages. Cf Sindell v.
Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980).
186. See Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974). Nor did the court accept
what many persons thought was a legislative reversal of its decision. See Gates v. Jensen, 92
Wash. 2d 246, 253-54, 595 P.2d 919, 924 (1979).
187. See Miller v. Kennedy, 11 Wash. App. 272, 522 P.2d 852, aff'd, 85 Wash. 2d 151, 530
P.2d 334 (1974).
188. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics estimated that during 1989 the proportion of United
States workers belonging to labor unions shrunk to 16.4% and that only 18.6% of U.S. workers
were represented by unions. Union Membership Down To 16.4 Percent in 1989 133 Lab. Rel.
Rep. (BNA) 209-10 (Feb. 19, 1990).
189. 65 Wash. 2d 827, 400 P.2d 72 (1965).
190. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.32.030 (West 1990).
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to organize unions and bargain collectively. The decision was consid-
ered a specialized development of state labor law.19 Like the decision
of the California Court of Appeals in Petermann v.- Teamsters Local
396, 192 it was not viewed as establishing general protection against dis-
charges violating public policy, nor was it considered a general repudi-
ation of the employment-at-will doctrine.
B. The First Direct Challenges
The first Washington Supreme Court case involving a direct chal-
lenge to the employment-at-will doctrine was Roberts v. Atlantic Rich-
field Co. 193 In that 1977 case, the employee's principal argument was
that his discharge violated the Washington law prohibiting age dis-
crimination in employment. The employee also argued that he had an
implied agreement that his employment was not terminable at will
because he had given consideration in addition to performance of serv-
ices. Finally, the employee argued that the court should either abolish
the employment-at-will doctrine or make a new exception to it. In
support of his third contention, the employee directed the court's
attention to public policy exceptions recognized in other states. The
employee also pointed to the New Hampshire court's decision in
Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co. 194 invalidating a discharge motivated by
bad faith or malice. The court rejected all the employee's arguments
and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the case. The court said that
on the record it could not reach the question of whether it should
abandon the terminable at-will doctrine or follow the Monge court.
The court also said, "[w]hile the future of this doctrine is a compelling
issue, it is one that must be left for another day and different facts. 19 5
The court did not reconsider the issue until 1984, when it decided
Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co. 196 Once again, the court rejected the
employee's arguments that he had an implied agreement that he would
be discharged only for cause because of the employer's policy state-
191. See Peck, Judicial Creativity And State Labor Law, 40 WASH. L. REv. 743 (1965). In
Krystad, the court presented a short history of labor law from the time of the 1349 English
Statute of Labourers, 23 Edw. 3 (1349), through recent developments in this nation and in the
state, leading to a conclusion that the little Norris-LaGuardia Act had been enacted to serve a
purpose beyond that of legitimizing labor unions. That purpose was, the court said, to confer
rights on employees for the violation of which actions could be brought. 65 Wash. 2d at 846, 400
P.2d at 83.
192. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959); see supra notes 23-24 (discussing Petermann).
193. 88 Wash. 2d 887, 568 P.2d 764 (1977).
194. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974); see supra notes 29-31 (discussing Monge).
195. Roberts, 88 Wash. 2d at 898, 568 P.2d at 770.
196. 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984).
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ments or because he had given consideration in addition to the con-
templated service. It then turned to developments concerning
employment at will in other states. Although the Washington court
had previously held that there is an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing in all contracts, 197 it refused to recognize the presence of
such an obligation in a contract of employment, saying:
An employer's interest in running his business as he sees fit must be
balanced against the interest of the employee in maintaining his employ-
ment and this exception does not strike the proper balance. We believe
that "to imply into each employment contract a duty to terminate in
good faith would... subject each discharge to judicial incursions into
the amorphous concept of bad faith." Moreover, while an employer
may agree to restrict or limit his right to discharge an employee, to
imply such a restriction on that right from the existence of a contractual
right, which, by its terms has no restrictions, is internally
inconsistent. 1
98
The latter part of the court's statement misses the point emphasized
by the dissenters in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. 199 The covenant is
imposed by law, not implied from agreed-upon contract provisions.
The covenant's function is to prevent a party from doing something
not specifically prohibited or specifically authorized at the time the
contract was made, thereby assuring both parties, not merely one of
the parties, the full benefit of the contract. Insofar as the concept of
good faith performance of the contract is concerned, the reasons par-
ties enter into employment contracts are either self-evident or easily
ascertainable. The court's timidity about judging what is bad faith
with respect to contracts of employment, which involve everyday
problems of human relationships, leaves one amazed at its willingness
197. Lonsdale v. Chesterfield, 99 Wash. 2d 353, 357, 662 P.2d 385, 387 (1983) (involving the
obligation of the purchaser of a developer's interest to install a water system on platted lots);
Miller v. Olthello Packers, Inc., 67 Wash. 2d 842, 844, 410 P.2d 33, 34 (1966) (involving
planting, growing, harvesting, and processing lima beans). Indeed, the court has repeated the
statement since its refusal to recognize the covenant in employment contracts. Metropolitan
Park Dist. v. Griffith, 106 Wash. 2d 425, 437, 723 P.2d 1093, 1100 (1986) (involving the refusal
of a city to allow the operator of an exclusive restaurant and food concession in a public park to
obtain a liquor license).
198. 102 Wash. 2d at 227-28, 685 P.2d at 1086 (citations omitted). The court's reference to
the employer as a single male individual is anomalous considering the corporate size of the St.
Regis Paper Company. Thinking of the employer as an individual who has provided the
occasion and means for employment does weight the argument in favor of the employer running
his business as he sees fit.
199. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 408, 413, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
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to impose that covenant on specialized contractual relationships with
which the court has had much less experience.2"°
The court in Thompson held that an employer could contractually
obligate itself by adopting policies in an employment manual if the
requirements of contract formation, offer, acceptance, and considera-
tion, are part of the initial employment contract or a modification of
that contract.2"1 In addition, the court held that an employer's distri-
bution of an employment manual can lead to obligations governing the
employment relationship. It does so if the employer creates an atmos-
phere of job security and fair treatment with promises of specific treat-
ment in specific situations and an employee is induced by such
promises to remain on the job and not seek employment elsewhere.2"2
The court reasoned that the employer creates the atmosphere for its
own benefit, and, having created employee expectations, the employer
has an obligation of treatment in accord with the written promises.20 3
The court made it clear, however, that employers might avoid such
obligations by conspicuous statements that nothing in a manual is
intended to be part of the employment relationship or anything more
than general statements of company policy." 4 In addition, it said the
employer may specifically reserve a right to modify policies or write
them in a manner that preserves employer discretion.20 5 The court
thus reassured employers by giving them advice as to how they could
avoid the obligations just recognized by the court.
In Thompson, the court joined the growing majority of jurisdictions
that recognize a cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge if that
discharge contravenes a clear mandate of public policy. The court
cautioned, however, that courts should proceed cautiously if called
upon to declare public policy absent some prior legislative or judicial
expression on the subject.20 6 The court said this properly balanced the
interests of the employer and employee, giving protection against friv-
200. See cases cited supra note 197.
201. 102 Wash. 2d at 228-29, 685 P.2d at 1087.
202. Id at 229-30, 685 P.2d at 1087-88.
203. Id at 230, 685 P.2d at 1088 (quoting Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich.
579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980)).
204. IM:
205. Id. at 231, 685 P.2d at 1088. Compare the court's refusal to recognize exculpatory
clauses in leases of premises in multifamily dwelling complexes, McCutcheon v. United Homes
Corp., 79 Wash. 2d 443, 486 P.2d 1093 (1971), and its insistence that there is an implied
warranty of habitability in all contracts for rental of housing, even though the tenant knew of the
defects at the time the rental contract was made. Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160
(1973).
206. Thompson, 102 Wash. 2d at 232, 685 P.2d at 1089 (quoting Parnar v. Americana Hotels,
65 Hawaii 370, 380, 652 P.2d 625, 631 (1982)).
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olous law suits and permitting employers to make personnel decisions
without fear of incurring civil liability.2" 7 If the employee proves that
the discharge may have been motivated by considerations violating a
clear mandate of public policy, the burden then falls on the employer
to prove that the dismissal was for reasons other than those alleged by
the employee. 208
The court offered no basis for its conclusion that employee claims of
unjust discharge that did not involve violations of public policy are
frivolous. An employer clearly has no protectable interest in conduct
that violates public policy, but employees certainly have an interest in
job security that goes beyond protection from that kind of conduct.
Whether a challenged personnel decision is one that an employer
should be free to make without fear of civil liability should be the
question and not the answer to whether an exception to the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine should be recognized.
Thus, Thompson offered the possibility of providing protection
against unjust discharge under both contractual and tort principles.
But the court's concern for preserving an employer's freedom to run a
business was apparent from the outset. The opinion carried warnings
that the Washington court did not believe it was necessary to make
any substantial change in the power relationship between employers
and their employees. Subsequent developments provide no basis for
greater optimism that meaningful protection will be forthcoming.
C. Failures of Tort Theory
As previously noted, in Thompson, the court limited the public pol-
icy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine by emphasizing that
a court should look to prior judicial decisions and legislation in deter-
mining what constitutes a violation of public policy. Because all prior
judicial decisions recognized the employment-at-will doctrine and the
unlimited power it gave employers, judicial decisions are not likely to
be a significant source of protection for employees. The limitation
does protect the court from charges of meddling with the power rela-
tionship of employers and employees. But that leaves only the legisla-
ture to limit employer power. Limiting wrongful discharge actions to
those instances where an employer has violated legislative policies
does little to prevent employers from using their "iron fist" by dis-
charging employees for reasons unrelated to the efficiency or profit-
ability of operations.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 232-33, 685 P.2d at 1089.
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In Trumbauer v. Group Health Coop,' 9 it was undisputed that the
plaintiff had performed adequately as an accounting clerk and office
assistant during his short probationary period.21 ° The plaintiff was
discharged because of the discovery that he had had a brief sexual
relationship with his supervisor several years prior to beginning his
employment. The supervisor hired the plaintiff, but the sexual rela-
tionship did not exist during the plaintiff's employment. The
employer had a nepotism rule prohibiting one family member from
supervising another, but the rule had not yet been applied to persons
in other relationships. The United States District Court rejected the
employee's claim of unjust discharge. The court found no statute or
judicial decision prohibiting discrimination based on a social relation-
ship and concluded that the relationship did not enjoy constitutional
protection. 2"
Recently, in Dicomes v. State,21 2 the Washington Supreme Court
enlarged the public policy basis for wrongful discharge suits to include
discharges violating the Washington Whistle Blower statute.213 That
enlargement produced no real benefit for the plaintiff employee. The
Washington statute recognizes the importance of protecting govern-
ment employees who are discharged for reporting improper govern-
mental action. The court said that in determining whether a discharge
contravenes the public policy of protecting employees it will consider
"whether the employer's conduct constitute[s] either a violation of the
letter or [the] policy of the law, so long as the employee sought to
further the public good, and not merely private or proprietary inter-
ests.",214 In Dicomes, the employee claimed that she was discharged
from her position as executive secretary to the Washington Medical
Disciplinary Board and Board of Medical Examiners because she
released information indicating that the director of the Department of
Licensing had not included funds from the medical disciplinary
account in its budget surplus. State law provided that funds deposited
in the account should be used to administer and implement the law.215
The court found no violation of state law in the director's decision not
to include the medical disciplinary account surplus funds in his budget
proposal. The court concluded that the plaintiff, whose conduct might
209. 635 F. Supp. 543 (W.D. Wash. 1986).
210. Ia at 546.
211. It at 549.
212. 113 Wash. 2d 612, 782 P.2d 1002 (1989).
213. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 42.40.010-.900 (West 1990). The statute is limited in its
application to government employees reporting "improper governmental actions."
214. Dicomes, 113 Wash. 2d at 620, 782 P.2d at 1008.
215. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 18.72.390 (West 1989).
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have been praiseworthy from a subjective standpoint, and from which
the public might have derived some remote benefit, had not estab-
lished a contravention of a clear mandate of public policy. The court
held that the employee therefore failed to state a claim under the pub-
lic policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. z16
By a law enacted in 1983, the Legislature had effectively doubled
the amount collected from physicians for medical discipline.2 17 The
statutez18 provides that all assessments, fines, and other funds col-
lected be deposited in the medical disciplinary account and used to
implement the law. There is no express requirement that all the funds
in the account be appropriated to medical disciplinary actions; the leg-
islature retains the power to make such appropriations. But it seems
unlikely that the Washington Medical Disciplinary Board, the Board
of Medical Examiners, or the Legislature can make intelligent deci-
sions about the amount that should be appropriated to support disci-
plinary actions in a biennium unless they know how much money is
available for that purpose. Ignorance concerning what can be done to
protect the public through medical disciplinary proceedings obviously
endangers the public; creation of that ignorance should be considered
contrary to a clear mandate of public policy. The court said, however,
that it did not accept the plaintiff's claim that the failure to budget
surplus funds substantially and specifically endangered the public
health or safety.219 Instead, the court found the plaintiff's discharge
justifiable because of her lack of loyalty to her superior who made a
political decision to withhold important information from authorized
decision-makers. 220  The Dicomes decision is consistent with the
court's statement in Thompson that courts should proceed cautiously
in determining what constitutes public policy for the purposes of
wrongful discharge law. That caution or timidity, however, guaran-
tees that employees will receive little protection from consideration of
the policy of a law.
Recognition of tort principles as a limitation on employer power to
terminate employment raises the question of how much of tort damage
law is applicable to tortious terminations of employment. Fairly soon
after its decision in Thompson, the court raised hopes for generous
damage awards. In Cagle v. Burns & Roe,221 the court held that in a
216. 113 Wash. 2d at 623-24, 782 P.2d at 1009-10.
217. Id. at 621, 782 P.2d at 1008.
218. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.72.390 (West 1989).
219. Dicomes, 113 Wash. 2d at 623, 782 P.2d at 1009.
220. Id.
221. 106 Wash. 2d 911, 726 P.2d 434 (1986).
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suit for a termination of employment violating public policy, damages
for emotional distress are recoverable. The court reasoned that tor-
tious discharge is an intentional tort, and that it had permitted such
damages in actions that did not vindicate dignity or personality inter-
ests.222 The court further held that in order to recover damages for
emotional distress resulting from a wrongful discharge, the employee
need not prove either that the employer intended to cause the distress
or that the distress was reasonably foreseeable.223 This analysis of
prior decisions led to a conclusion supporting the claims of employees,
but the court apparently failed to recognize that a discharge from
employment is almost always an affront to personal dignity and results
in substantial emotional distress.
D. The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
As previously noted, the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is closely related to tort principles of responsibility and liabil-
ity. The covenant is a general principle of law applicable to parties in
a contractual relationship. The covenant is not based upon the negoti-
ations that resulted in the contractual relationship. The covenant
offers possibilities for even greater protection against unjust discharge
than tort theories limited to public policy violations. Early rejection of
the covenant in Thompson was emphatic, but reconsideration is always
possible. Unfortunately, the first case raising this issue after Thomp-
son was so weak on its facts that it was probably the worst case in
which reconsideration could have been sought.
That case was Willis v. Champlain Cable Corp.224 The parties to a
formal written contract designating one of them a sales representative
made specific provisions for termination of the agreement and for
computation of commissions due following a termination. The court
rejected the plaintiff's attempt to use the covenant to claim commis-
sions on sales made as much as a year and one-half after the relation-
ship was terminated. The court concluded that both the employer and
employee had complied with the express terms of the contract, and
that they were determinative of the employee's rights.225
There would have been a better opportunity for development of the
law, perhaps first giving recognition to the implied covenant in one of
its less encompassing versions, if the attempt had not been made in
222. IaL at 916, 726 P.2d at 436.
223. Id. at 919-20, 726 P.2d at 438.
224. 109 Wash. 2d 747, 748 P.2d 621 (1988).
225. Id. at 759, 748 P.2d at 628.
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Willis. Unfortunately, the decision stands as a reinforcement of the
court's refusal to consider the covenant applicable to employment
contracts.
E. Developments of Contract Theory
Except for rejection of the implied covenant, Thompson offered the
possibility for developing contract theories protecting against unjust
discharge on two bases developed in other states: (1) express contracts
derived from provisions found in employment manuals and (2) estop-
pel of employers who had created for their benefit an atmosphere of
fair treatment and job security. Decisions issued immediately after
Thompson suggested that this protection would be substantial. More
recent decisions have undermined that expectation.
The first decision after Thompson of an unjust discharge claim based
on contract, Brady v. Daily World,226 suggested a liberal standard for
what constituted sufficient evidence for a jury question on whether a
contract required good cause for termination of employment. After
serving as a pressman for thirty-two years, the plaintiff was discharged
for being intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol while on the
job. A personnel handbook contained a section entitled "Dismissal
For Cause." Among the grounds listed as sufficient for dismissal was
"Intoxication or drug abuse." The section also stated that "Any deci-
sion which requires such action [termination of employment] is made
only after careful consideration of all known facts." On the
employer's motion for summary judgment the court considered the
evidence and inferences in plaintiff's favor. It concluded that whether
any of the employer policies amounted to promises of specific treat-
ment in specific situations and whether plaintiff justifiably relied upon
such promises presented questions of fact that remained to be
proven.227 Likewise, whether "being under the influence" was the
equivalent of "intoxication" was considered a question of fact that
remained to be proven.228 Moreover, plaintiff testified that he had
been told he was doing a good job and would be employed as long as
he was doing a good job.229 The court concluded that plaintiff had,
226. 105 Wash. 2d 770, 718 P.2d 785 (1986).
227. Id. at 775, 718 P.2d at 788.
228. Id. at 776, 718 P.2d at 788. Other issues of fact were raised by plaintiff's denial of
consumption of more than two beers with dinner on the date of his discharge, and the fact that
he was permitted to work his entire shift prior to discharge. In addition, his performance
evaluation for the period immediately before that discharge did not refer to a drinking problem.
Id.
229. Id.
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therefore, raised genuine issues of fact, making summary judgment
inappropriate.
Obviously, a statement that any decision requiring termination of
employment will be made only after careful consideration of all the
facts is neither an express promise that discharges will only be for just
cause nor an express promise of specific treatment in specific situa-
tions. Remanding the case for trial gives an employee the opportunity
to prove what meaning the words of the manual had acquired in the
employer's workplace. This approach affords employees the level of
job security that they have been led to believe they have by their
employers' practices.
Two subsequent decisions of the Washington Court of Appeals dis-
played a similar liberality in determining whether there were jury
issues on contractual claims of unjust discharge.3 0 But the recent
decision of the supreme court in Stewart v. Chevron Chemical Co.231
turns those issues into questions of law and takes them from the jury.
In Stewart, the court reversed a judgment on a jury verdict for an
.employee whose employment was terminated in a staff reduction after
twenty-nine years of service. The jury had based its verdict on the
employee's claim that the termination of his employment violated his
employment contract because the employer failed to comply with a
provision of its policy manual. That manual contained a section stat-
ing: "In determining the sequence of layoffs due to lack of work, con-
sideration should be given to performance, experience and length of
service.
' 2 3 2
Adopting the principle that the interpretation of a writing is a ques-
tion of law, the court determined that the word "should" in the policy
manual was merely advisory. Likewise, the section required only that
the named factors be "considered" and therefore did not constitute a
promise. Moreover, the employee did not specifically testify that he
had relied on the layoff provision of the manual, and therefore the
court concluded he failed to establish that he had justifiably- relied on
the provision. The fact that he had testified that he had consulted the
manual on several occasions to see what his rights were and the fact
that fifteen or sixteen years earlier he had turned down a job offer in
230. Swanson v. Liquid Air Corp., 55 Wash. App. 917, 781 P.2d 900 (1989); Adler v. Ryder
Truck Rental, 53 Wash. App. 33, 765 P.2d 910 (1988), review denied, 112 Wash. 2d 1013 (1989).
231. 111 Wash. 2d 609, 762 P.2d 1143 (1988), overruled, Berg v. Hudesman, 115 Wash. 2d
657, 801 P.2d 222 (1990).
232. Id. at 611, 762 P.2d at 1144.
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reliance on the security he believed the manual provided were not suf-
ficient to establish justifiable reliance as a matter of law.2 33
Holding that determination of the meaning of the words in the man-
ual is a question of law for determination by the court is inconsistent
with the Thompson ruling that an employer who creates an atmos-
phere of job security creates an expectation, and thus an obligation, of
treatment in accord with those written promises.234 The effect the
words of the manual had at the work place should determine what
such provisions mean, not what a judge in chambers thinks they
should mean. Similarly, whether employees had come to believe that
policies stated in a manual are applied consistently and uniformly to
each employee presents a question of what effect the manual had in the
work place. If the manual created employee expectations of fair treat-
ment and job security, the employer created a situation "instinct with
obligation. 235
The court's decision in St. Yves v. Mid State Bank 236 similarly lim-
ited the jury's role in resolving factual questions concerning an
employment contract. In St. Yves, the president of a bank had a for-
mal written employment contract. One clause of the contract pro-
vided that his employment was to be for a two-year period,
automatically renewed for successive one-year terms unless either
party advised the other with sixty days written notice that the employ-
ment would not be renewed. Another clause stated that the presi-
dent's right to compensation "will cease upon termination of his
employment for any reason, and the term hereof shall... end." The
contract further provided that the president's "termination by bank at
any time, during any term of employment, with or without cause or
notice, shall not constitute a breach of this agreement by bank. 2 37
The trial court dismissed the wrongful discharge claim, but the
court of appeals reversed on the ground that there was a question of
fact for jury determination of whether a personnel manual created an
independent basis for a wrongful discharge claim, even assuming that
the formal employment contract was unambiguous.238 Noting that
both Thompson and Brady were cases in which there were no written
233. Id. at 614, 762 P.2d at 1145-46.
234. Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 230, 685 P.2d 1081, 1088 (1984).
235. Id. at 230, 685 P.2d at 1088. For a very good analysis and criticism of the Stewart
decision, see Note, The Personnel Manual Exception to Employment-At- Will: Is Job Security
Merely an Illusion?, 64 WASH. L. REv. 997 (1989).
236. 111 Wash. 2d 374, 757 P.2d 1384 (1988), overruled, Berg v. Hudesman, 115 Wash. 2d
657, 666, 669, 801 P.2d 222, 228, 230 (1990); see infra note 240.
237. St. Yves, 111 Wash. 2d at 375, 757 P.2d at 1385.
238. Id. at 378, 757 P.2d at 1386.
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employment contracts, the supreme court reversed the court of
appeals and held that the right to rely on promises in personnel policy
manuals did not override the application of the parol evidence rule for
express contracts.239 The court concluded that the clause relating to
termination of employment was a limitation of the clause establishing
the term of employment;2 therefore, the contract was unambiguous
and governed the case.
In dissent, Justice Dore persuasively argued that the contract of
employment was ambiguous and that the manual provisions were
needed to resolve that ambiguity.241 But even if the formal employ-
ment contract was unambiguous, that fact should not have precluded
the parties from entering into a new or modified contract. The
employer adopted the manual in the year in which the plaintiff was
hired. Under the Thompson rationale, if the employer had created an
atmosphere of job security and fair treatment, the employer's promises
that create such an atmosphere become enforceable. Whether that
atmosphere had been created is not controlled by the parol evidence
rule. It should have been a factual question for jury resolution. As
matters now stand, however, it appears that a clear statement in a
contract of employment that it is terminable with or without cause or
notice enables an employer subsequently to create an atmosphere of
job security and enjoy all the benefits thereof without responsibility to
live up to what employees have justifiably come to expect.242
A recent decision of the Washington Court of Appeals gives a con-
tinuing and enduring effect to a statement on an application form that
employment might be terminated at any time by either party long after
the date of the application.243 The employee sought to rely upon pro-
239. Id. at 379, 757 P.2d at 1387.
240. Ia at 378, 757 P.2d at 1386-87.
241. Ia at 380-85, 757 P.2d at 1388-90 (Dore, J., dissenting).
242. The Washington Supreme Court has since overruled cases, including St. Yves, in which
it had held that an ambiguity in the meaning of contract language must exist before evidence of
the circumstances surrounding the making of the contract and subsequent conduct of the parties
is admissible for interpretation of the contract. Berg v. Hudesman, 115 Wash. 2d 657, 666, 669,
801 P.2d 222, 228, 230 (1990). Whether this development in general contract law will produce a
different result in an employment case like St. Yves is problematical. In St. Yves; the court
emphasized that, while employment manuals had been given effect in Thompson and Brady,
those were cases in which there were no written employment contracts. 111 Wash. 2d at 379,
757 P.2d at 1387. It also spoke of the pre-emptive effect of specific contractual terms. Ia And it
did not accept the conclusion of the court of appeals that a right to continued employment might
be found in a personnel manual. Id. at 378-79, 757 P.2d at 1386. Thus it is possible that a
manual will be given weight only for interpreting what the parties meant at the time an
employment contract was made, but not for the purpose of establishing new contractual rights.
243. Grimes v. Allied Stores Corp., 53 Wash. App. 554, 768 P.2d 528 (1989); see also
Messerly v. Asamera Minerals, (U.S.) Inc., 55 Wash. App. 811, 780 P.2d 1327 (1989).
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visions of a personnel manual issued some ten years after she had
signed an application form with such a statement. The court held that
the at-will provision prevailed, noting that the policies of the manual
might have been made part of the contract of employment if the par-
ties had complied with the requirements of offer, acceptance, and con-
sideration.2" It is deliriously fanciful to imagine an employee of a
large department store proposing a renegotiation of her contract of
employment to incorporate the manual provisions, but realistic to
believe that its provisions gave her a sense of job security. If this deci-
sion is followed, employers have a formula to avoid all of the contract
protection the court appeared to give employees in its Thompson
decision.
F. The Meaning of a Just Cause Provision in an Employment
Contract
If an employee manages to avoid all of the barriers set up by the
Washington Supreme Court by establishing that his or her contract of
employment requires just cause or good cause for termination of that
employment, there remains the question of the meaning of those
terms. The supreme court recently supplied an answer in Baldwin v.
Sisters of Providence. 245 In Baldwin, the parties agreed that the provi-
sion in an employee manual that the employer could discharge an
employee for "just cause" was contractually binding. They disagreed,
however, about what that standard meant and who had the burden of
proof with respect to whether a discharge had occurred in accordance
with that standard. The trial court placed the burden of proof on the
defendant employer to prove that the plaintiff was dismissed for just
cause and defined just cause as meaning "that under the facts and cir-
cumstances existing at the time the decision is made, an employer had
a good, substantial and legitimate business reason for terminating the
employment of a particular employee."246
The supreme court first decided that it was error to instruct the jury
that the employer had the burden of proof that plaintiff was dismissed
for just cause.247 The court reasoned that the burden of proof of an
employer in a contractually based wrongful discharge case should not
be greater than the employer's burden in statutory employment dis-
crimination cases.248 The court said that, as with discrimination cases,
244. Grimes, 53 Wash. App. at 557, 768 P.2d at 529-30.
245. 112 Wash. 2d 127, 769 P.2d 298 (1989).
246. Id. at 136, 769 P.2d at 303.
247. Id. at 133-36, 769 P.2d at 301-02.
248. Id. at 135, 769 P.2d at 302.
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the burden on the employer in an unjust discharge case will arise only
after. the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, and then it con-
sists only of articulating reasons sufficient to meet the prima facie case.
The burden of persuasion remains on the employee to show that the
articulated reasons for discharge are mere pretext.249
The court also concluded that the trial court had erred in its
instruction concerning what constitutes just cause.250 It concluded
that an employer's agreement to discharge only for just cause does not
constitute an agreement that the employer has surrendered the power
to determine whether facts constituting cause for termination exist.
While it said employers should not be allowed to make arbitrary deter-
minations of just cause, it concluded that a sufficient protection
against such actions would be provided by a good faith standard lim-
ited by an objective reasonable belief standard. The court held that
"'just cause' is a fair and honest cause or reason, regulated by good
faith on the part of the party exercising the power. We further hold a
discharge for 'just cause' is one.., based on facts (1) supported by
substantial evidence and (2) reasonably believed by the employer to be
true" and (3) which is not for any arbitrary, capricious, or illegal
reason."
251
The court expressed its concern that any more stringent standard
might induce employers to remove "just cause" provisions from their
personnel manuals.25 2 It likewise rejected the argument that use of a
good faith test was inconsistent with its refusal in Thompson to recog-
nize an implied covenant of good faith in employment contracts. In
Thompson, that recognition was denied because to grant it would
require judicial incursions into the amorphous concept of bad faith.
The explanation offered was that the test was of good faith and used to
determine whether a term "placed into a contract by the employer"
was breached. To bolster the determination that courts should not
review employer termination decisions beyond a good faith test, the
249. Id. at 136, 769 P.2d at 303; see Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 256 (1981).
250. Baldwin, 112 Wash. 2d at 136-39, 769 P.2d at 302-04.
251. IM. at 139, 769 P.2d at 304.
252. I at 139, 769 P.2d at 304. The Supreme Court of New Jersey took a drastically
different view of the possibility that employers might be reluctant to prepare and distribute
company policy manuals. It did not believe that the constructive aspects of such manuals would
be diminished, stating that it would be unfair to allow an employer to distribute a policy manual
that made the workforce believe that certain promises had been made and then allow the
employer to renege on those promises. What it sought was basic honesty on the part of the
employer. Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257, 1271 (1985).
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court relied on an opinion of the Supreme Court of Oregon.2 53 View-
ing an employee handbook as a unilateral statement of the employer,
the Oregon court found no reason to believe the employer had
intended to surrender its power to determine whether facts constitut-
ing cause for discharge exist.254
The Washington court's explanation of why the plaintiff must bear
the burden of proof in a case alleging wrongful discharge is unsatisfac-
tory.255 In a disparate treatment case under Title VII or state law, the
plaintiff contends that the cause of the discharge was a factor, such as
race or sex. Such a discharge is prohibited by the applicable statute.256
The plaintiff makes an affirmative allegation and normally the burden
of proof is placed on a party asserting the affirmative. In a wrongful
discharge case it is the employer that alleges the affirmative-that
there was cause for discharge. To place the burden of proof on the
employee requires the employee to undertake what is frequently
impossible, that is to prove a negative.257 Another factor governing
the allocation of the burden of proof is access to information. The
employer is the party who took the action and ought to be in the posi-
tion to establish why it took that action. Moreover, employers gener-
ally maintain elaborate personnel records; employees do not. For
these reasons the consistent practice of arbitrators who make determi-
nations of just cause under collective bargaining agreements is to place
the burden of proof on employers.258
The court's definition of what constitutes just cause is almost
unintelligible. Causes are not "fair" or "honest." People may be hon-
est or fair, but that honesty and fairness is in their reasoning or
thought processes and actions. A cause may be adequate or sufficient
to justify actions based on its existence. In the employment relation-
253. Baldwin, 112 Wash. 2d at 137-38, 769 P.2d at 303-04 (citing Simpson v. Western
Graphics Corp., 293 Or. 96, 643 P.2d 1276 (1982)).
254. Simpson, 293 Or. at 100-01, 643 P.2d at 1279.
255. For a less critical view of the Baldwin decision than what follows, see Comment,
Determining Just Cause: An Equitable Solution for the Workplace, 66 WASH. L. REv. - (1991).
256. For discussions of what constitutes a prima facie case, burdens of coming forward with
evidence, and burdens of proof, see Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 245
(1981) and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In cases arising under
Washington laws prohibiting racial and age discrimination, the supreme court has generally
followed precedents of the U.S. Supreme Court developed under federal anti-discrimination laws.
Grimwood v. University of Puget Sound, 110 Wash. 2d 355, 753 P.2d 517 (1988).
257. For example, how can an employee demonstrate that tardiness or absence from work did
not interfere with operations, that he never reported for work under the influence of alcohol or a
controlled substance, that he never fell asleep while at work, that he was not the one who
damaged a piece of equipment, or that his spoilage rate did not exceed that of other employees?
258. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 61, at 661.
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ship, that adequacy or sufficiency should turn on whether or not rec-
ognition of the cause as adequate furthers the legitimate interests of
the business enterprise without unduly harming the interests of the
parties to that relationship. It should be adequate and sufficient to
justify the injuries done to an employee who is discharged if it is to be
just. Justice is not subjective.
It seems impossible that a trier of fact can determine that a dis-
charge is "based on facts ... supported by substantial evidence"25 9
without reviewing both the evidence supporting and the evidence
against an employer's decision. And it seems impossible to determine
whether evidence is substantial without considering the relevance of
those facts to those legitimate interests of the business enterprise.
Whether an employer could reasonably believe facts to be true would
necessarily involve consideration of how thoroughly the employer
investigated a case, and this calls for review by a trier of fact. And it
seems an unacceptable distortion of language to say that a cause is
"just" simply because it can be said that it was not arbitrary, capri-
cious, or illegal to recognize it as the basis for action. If that is what
employers want to offer as assurances to their employees, their manu-
als should state only that employees will not be discharged for arbi-
trary, capricious, or illegal reasons.
The court's position in Baldwin that the words an employer placed
in a manual should not be construed as a surrender of employer power
is also in conflict with a well-established rule for interpreting contract
language. Ordinarily, the preferred meaning is that which operates
against the party who supplied the words or from whom the writing
came.2" The rule is particularly suitable when consideration is given
to the fact that employer representatives generally have much better
training, more experience, and greater ability than employees in pre-
paring written documents.
More importantly, in Baldwin the parties agreed that they had a
contract that required just cause for termination of employment. It
was not a unilateral statement by the employer. Moreover, even if it
had originally been a unilateral statement, the court's decision in
Thompson made the relevant question one of whether it had induced
259. Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence, 112 Wash. 2d 127, 137, 769 P.2d 298, 304 (1989).
260. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1982). That rule of interpretation of
disputed contract language has been applied by the Washington Supreme Court in numerous
cases over a long period of time. See Wilkins v. Grays Harbor Community Hosp., 71 Wash. 2d
178, 184, 427 P.2d 716, 720 (1967); Underwood v. Sterner, 63 Wash. 2d 360, 367, 387 P.2d 366,
370 (1963).
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reliance. If it had, pursuant to Thompson it should have been treated
as an obligation enforceable as a promise.2 61
Nor does it appear what value manual provisions requiring just
cause for discharge will have as contractual protections if they estab-
lish such limited restraints on employer power. Indeed, the court's
test of just cause makes it possible for employers to create an atmos-
phere of job security and fair treatment without actually providing
either.
The court's lack of confidence in the judiciary's ability to determine
what constitutes just cause is unfounded: labor arbitrators have made
such determinations on the merits for many years, and their decisions
are reported in numerous volumes burdening library shelves. 62 The
Ninth Circuit recently decided that under Alaska law a good faith
belief that cause existed does not constitute just cause for discharge-
the employer must prove that the employee engaged in the forbidden
conduct.263 In so holding, the court noted that in Toussaint v. Blue
261. 102 Wash. 219, 230, 685 P.2d 1081, 1088 (1984).
262. There are now 93 bound volumes of Labor Arbitration Reports published by Bureau of
National Affairs. Commerce Clearing House has published approximately the same number of
Labor Arbitration Reports. Prentice Hall and other reporting services likewise report labor
arbitration decisions. Close to one half of the decisions reported are concerned with what
constitutes just cause for discharge or other discipline.
In addition, there are numerous treatises which deal with what constitutes just cause for
discharge or other discipline. See, e.g., F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 61, at 650-707;
M. HILL, JR. & A. SINICROPI, MANAGEMENT RIGHTS 94-113, 193-217 (1986).
One of the best and most frequently quoted statements of the criteria used by arbitrators in
determining whether there was just cause for discharge is in the form of seven questions posed by
arbitrator Carroll Daugherty:
1. Did the company give to the employee forewarning or foreknowledge of the possible or
probabl[e] disciplinary consequences of the employee's conduct.
2. Was the company's rule or managerial order reasonably related to (a) the orderly, efficient
and safe operation of the company's business and (b) the performance that the company might
properly expect of the employee?
3. Did the company, before administering discipline to an employee, make an effort to
discover whether the employee did in fact violate or disobey a rule or order of management?
4. Was the company's investigation conducted fairly and objectively?
5. At the investigation did the "judge" obtain substantial evidence or proof that the employee
was guilty as charged?
6. Has the company applied its rules, orders and penalties evenhandedly and without
discrimination to all employees?
7. Was the degree of discipline administered by the company in a particular case reasonably
related to (a) the seriousness of the employee's proven offense and (b) the record of the employee
in his service with the company?
Arbitrator Daugherty stated that a "no" answer to one or more of the questions normally
indicates that just cause for discipline did not exist. Enterprise Wire Co., 46 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
359, 363-64 (1966) (Daugherty, Arb.).
263. Sanders v. Parker Drilling Co., 911 F.2d 191, 194-95 (9th Cir. 1990).
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Cross & Blue Shield,2 the case that provided much of the basis for
the Washington decision in Thompson, the Michigan court said that a
promise to terminate employment for cause only would be illusory if
the employer were permitted to be the sole judge and final arbiter of
the propriety of the discharge.265 The Michigan court also said that
where the employee has secured a promise not to be discharged except
for cause, he has contracted for more than the employer's promise to
act in good faith or not to be unreasonable.266 Hopefully, the Wash-
ington court will abandon its deficient definition of just cause and
incorporate a standard more in accord with that set out in the case
that provided the foundation for its Thompson decision. Alterna-
tively, if the definition ofjust cause given in Baldwin proves to be diffi-
cult and brings about reconsideration of the matter, the court should
consider the definition developed by the drafting committee for the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.267 The Commissioners have
not yet approved the definition, but it was developed with the advice of
lawyers from the American Bar Association Section on Labor and
Employment Law and the Section on Tort and Insurance Practice.
Also included as advisors were representatives of the AFL-CIO, the
American Trial Lawyers Association, the National Association of
Manufacturers, the Plaintiff Employment Lawyers Association, the
United States Chamber of Commerce, and other interested groups. 268
The product, distilled from the advice of diverse groups familiar with
problems of employment law, has much greater appeal than the con-
fusing definition provided in Baldwin. It is a definition that will
achieve the goal set forth in Thompson of balancing the interests of
employers in running their businesses with the interests of employees
in obtaining real and meaningful protection against unjust discharge.
IV. CONCLUSION
The law governing wrongful discharge is still developing in state
supreme courts throughout the United States. Washington state is
behind other states in developing that law and providing protection for
employees. It is even further behind the law of other developed
nations of the world.2 69
264. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.w.2d 880 (1980).
265. 292 N.W.2d at 895.
266. Id. at 896.
267. See supra note 161.
268. Uniform Termination Act (Discussion Draft 1990), reported in 9A Lab. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) 540:21 (Jan. 1991).
269. See supra note 47.
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Unfortunately, both in Washington and elsewhere, courts frequently
forget the reasons for developing exceptions to the employment-at-will
doctrine. Instead, courts direct their attention to applying traditional
concepts of contract or tort law to cases. As indicated at the begin-
ning of this Article, I believe courts undertook a course of revising and
rejecting the employment-at-will doctrine because they sensed that it
was no longer acceptable in contemporary society.27° Courts should
remain committed to that undertaking.
Most certainly the public policy exception did not develop because
it was discovered that various public policies needed additional
enforcement. Most of those policies had existed and were imple-
mented for many years without the support of wrongful discharge
cases. The public policy exception received recognition because it per-
mitted courts to provide job protection without criticism that the judi-
ciary had assumed a role of supervising employer decisions, or passing
on what constitutes just cause for discharge. The disguise was in that
way useful, but it should not divert the courts from the initial under-
taking of providing needed job protection for employees who have
none. Upon occasion it is obvious that protection should be provided
even though the disguise is not available.
The standards of what would establish that an enforceable promise
of job security had been made were relaxed, not because errors of con-
tract doctrine had been discovered, but for the purpose of providing
job security. That purpose is not served when courts give effect to
adhesion contract waivers of job security in employment applications
or apply the parol evidence rule to bar consideration of the realities of
the work place.
One of the realities of the work place is that there is a substantial
number of employees who every year suffer from abuse of power by
employers.27' Society has an interest in ensuring that all employees
are protected from abuse of employer power, and that protection not
be limited to those who experienced a particular type of abuse through
discrimination. Those employees who have received particularized
statutory protection from abuse of employer power were able to obtain
that protection because they were members of groups with organiza-
tions that could effectively bring political pressure on Congress and
state legislatures to enact the statutes. Unprotected employees, who
have representation by neither labor unions nor by other organiza-
tions, have no effective spokespersons or advocates to advance their
270. See supra text accompanying notes 46-69.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 66-67.
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cause in legislative halls. Decisions of courts exposing the abuses of
employer power and the harm imposed on employees, certifying by
their judgments the need for job protection, can thus do more than
provide justice for individual cases. Indeed, those decisions may
induce employers, who among those concerned with the problem,
probably have the only effective legislative representation to achieve
the task, to obtain enactment of statutes providing job security with
forums and procedures superior to those provided in courtroom litiga-
tion. Until that is accomplished, however, courts should continue to
press on in developing job protection because the problems are great
and the need is real.
At times it may be prudent to provide that protection using the
camouflage of existing tort and contract doctrines. The most useful is
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which can be
adapted to ensure on a case by case basis that there was just cause for
termination of employment. It is to be hoped, however, that some
court will exhibit the courage of Justice Traynor and the California
Supreme Court when they abandoned doctrinal fictions and openly
stated a new rule of strict liability for defective products.272 That cou-
rageous court should announce a general rule of employment law
requiring just cause for termination of employment.
272. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
It is noteworthy that several years after the Greenman decision Justice Traynor acknowledged
that there was no single definition of "defect" that proved adequate to define the scope of a
manufacturer's strict liability. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict
Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363, 373 (1965).
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